The Open Technology Fund (OTF), in its latest report, has raised serious concerns about the safety and privacy of messengers approved by the Iranian regime. The report highlights that these platforms not only violate user privacy but also enable government surveillance through state-controlled servers.
Investigation of Iranian Messengers
OTF, supported by the U.S. government, conducted a ten-month investigation through its security laboratory to examine three Iranian messengers: Bale, Ita, and Rubika. The study aimed to assess potential security and privacy risks for users and evaluate the functionality and efficiency of these platforms.
Widespread Use Under Regime Control
The Iranian regime claims that Bale, Ita, and Rubika are the top three messengers in the country, with millions of users. Official data indicates that 89 million citizens have registered accounts on at least one of these platforms. Despite their popularity, OTF’s findings suggest that these messengers are deeply embedded within the regime’s surveillance framework.
Security and Privacy Concerns
The OTF laboratory scrutinized various technical aspects of the messengers, including:
- Encryption Protocols: The security of encryption mechanisms was analyzed, revealing significant vulnerabilities.
- Data Transmission: Concerns were identified regarding the unexpected transfer of private data, including activation of device sensors such as microphones without user consent.
- Artificial Intelligence Use: While no evidence was found that AI is currently being used to enforce regime policies, such as identifying women violating hijab regulations, the potential for such applications remains a concern.
Researchers concluded that the servers supporting these messengers are under direct supervision of the regime, allowing easy access to user data. These platforms also analyze online user behavior, tracking website visits and other internet activities.
Security Vulnerabilities and State Surveillance
The report identified several security flaws in the three messengers, exposing users to privacy breaches and other risks. It emphasized that the primary purpose of these platforms is to facilitate government censorship and surveillance. The Iranian regime uses these tools to monitor and control its citizens’ online activities.
Details About Each Messenger
- Ita Messenger: According to the Iranian Minister of Information and Communications Technology, Ita’s user base grew from 3 million to 19 million in the last quarter of 2023.
- Rubika Messenger: Developed by Hamrah-e Avval, a subsidiary of the state-controlled Mobile Communications Company of Iran (MCI), Rubika has been heavily promoted for banking services. By spring 2023, it reportedly had 40 million users.
- Bale Messenger: Created by Sadad Informatics Corporation, Bale offers banking services and has become a mandatory tool for accessing many e-government services. By mid-2023, it had 16.5 million users.
The investigation revealed that at least two of these platforms rely on Telegram’s codebase, undermining the regime’s claims about the security of these messengers. All three messengers store user data on regime-controlled servers and share information with one another.
Limited Use of AI but Persistent Risks
While the study found no current evidence of AI being used to analyze message content, the inclusion of mobile device identifiers enables precise tracking of users. This capability adds another layer of surveillance to an already restrictive environment.
A Decades-Long Campaign for Control
Over the past two decades, Iranian regime security institutions have aggressively promoted the use of domestic messengers while restricting access to popular foreign platforms like WhatsApp. During anti-regime protests, authorities have frequently shut down or severely limited internet access to suppress dissent.
Freedom House has consistently ranked Iran among the most repressive regimes in terms of internet freedom, citing practices such as limiting international bandwidth, strictly regulating domestic cyberspace, and blocking foreign applications.
Conclusion
The OTF’s findings underscore the significant risks associated with using Iranian regime-approved messengers. These platforms serve as tools of state surveillance and censorship, compromising user privacy and safety. The report serves as a warning to users and underscores the importance of global advocacy for internet freedom and digital security.
