In recent developments within the Iranian regime, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reiterated his call for greater restrictions on cyberspace, referring to the current state of the internet in Iran as “uncontrolled.” Following his directives, the newly appointed president of the regime, Masoud Pezeshkian, has demanded the swift implementation of Khamenei’s orders to “properly manage cyberspace.” This article delves into the history and evolution of internet filtering in Iran, the structures that enforce it, and the potential future of the internet in the country.

Khamenei’s Directives and Pezeshkian’s Response

On Wednesday, August 28, President Masoud Pezeshkian instructed his ministers to prioritize the Supreme Leader’s concerns regarding the “uncontrolled” nature of cyberspace in Iran. In a cabinet meeting held the previous day, Khamenei had emphasized the importance of enforcing the rule of law in cyberspace, stating, “Virtual space is no longer virtual today; it is a reality in people’s lives and is progressing day by day.”

Following Pezeshkian’s orders, Aghamiri, the Secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, appeared on a television program to underscore the necessity of managing relationships in cyberspace. He acknowledged that cyberspace in Iran is currently “uncontrolled” and that governance in this area is weak but promised that this governance would be strengthened over time through the establishment of new regulations.

Interestingly, Pezeshkian, who now advocates for tighter control over cyberspace, had previously criticized internet filtering during the presidential election debates, particularly for its negative impact on Iran’s economy. Despite this, the regime is once again taking steps to further restrict internet access, reinforcing its status as one of the most internet-restrictive governments in the world.

The Regime’s History of Internet Censorship

Iran’s approach to internet censorship is not new. The regime has consistently sought to limit its citizens’ access to the global internet, often forcing them to rely on VPNs to bypass extensive restrictions and censorship. A significant milestone in this effort was the introduction of the “Cyberspace Services Regulation System Act,” a plan designed to impose tighter controls on the internet. The implementation of this plan has led to widespread protests among the Iranian populace.

According to a report by Reuters, the regime regularly penalizes internet users based on their online activities. Additionally, the digital rights group Access Now reported that Iran ranked third globally in terms of internet outages in the previous year. These outages included nationwide and regional shutdowns of mobile phone networks, as well as the blocking of major platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp—the last two major platforms not entirely blocked in Iran.

The regime’s restrictions have extended to American-based social networks such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube, all of which have been filtered. Meanwhile, the Research Center of the regime’s parliament has reported a consistent decline in Iran’s ranking on the global Digital Quality of Life Index from 2020 to 2023, with decreases across all sub-indices.

The Birth of Internet Filtering in Iran

The concept of internet filtering in Iran dates back to the early 2000s. In 2001, the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution issued a decree that granted the government a monopoly over the internet and required internet service providers (ISPs) to obtain their internet access from the government. This decree also mandated that ISPs implement filtering systems to block access to “ethically and politically prohibited” websites.

The term “filtering” was introduced as a euphemism for content censorship. This decree was a response to an earlier document titled “General Policies of Computer Information Networks,” issued by Khamenei, which emphasized the need for “necessary measures and supervision to protect the security” of users and reduce the negative consequences of information networks.

The Evolution of Filtering Mechanisms

To enforce the filtering law, a series of committees and structures were gradually established, each with the authority to decide on the filtering of online platforms.

Initial Filtering Committee

In the early 2000s, the Initial Filtering Committee was formed, comprising representatives from the Ministries of Intelligence, Culture and Islamic Guidance, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Later, representatives from the Parliament Secretariat and the Islamic Propaganda Organization were added. This committee, established by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, provided ISPs with a list of at least 111,000 banned sites.

The Judiciary’s Role

Simultaneously, the judiciary played a role in enforcing filtering laws by prosecuting the administrators of offending sites. Reports indicate that in the mid-2000s, site and blog administrators were arrested, and their offices were sealed. The judiciary continues to use its authority to apply filtering or take action against various online platforms. For example, the Telegram messenger was filtered in May 2018 by judicial order.

The Committee for Determining Examples of Criminal Content

In the summer of 2009, following the controversial elections of that year, a new committee was formed—the Committee for Determining Examples of Criminal Content, commonly known as the Filtering Committee. This 12-member committee, led by the regime’s Attorney General, included representatives from various ministries, the police, parliament, and the Islamic Propaganda Organization. The committee’s primary responsibilities were to monitor and supervise sites containing criminal content and address complaints related to such content.

Online Filtering Committee

By 2018, the committee’s operations had shifted online, reducing the number of representatives from 12 to 5 and eliminating the requirement for majority votes. This new structure allowed for quicker decisions on filtering sites and platforms, bypassing the need for formal discussions among committee members.

The Supreme National Security Council

The Supreme National Security Council, a security structure with broad authority, can decide on the state of the internet across the entire country. This council has the power to order internet disruptions or shutdowns in specific regions or to block access to particular platforms for security reasons. For instance, during the protests of November 2019, which were sparked by a hike in gasoline prices, the council ordered a nationwide internet shutdown to prevent the spread of information and suppress the protests. The regime’s brutal crackdown during these protests resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 people.

SATRA: Monitoring Audio and Video Content

SATRA, the Regulatory Organization of Pervasive Audio and Video Media in Cyberspace, is a newly established organization under the supervision of IRIB. Its role is to monitor audio and video content available to Iranian users. Recent reports indicate that SATRA collaborates with various government bodies, including the Ministry of Intelligence and the police, to enforce its regulations.

The Future: National Internet and “Filternet”

Internet filtering in Iran has become so pervasive that some users refer to it as “filternet” in jest. However, the regime’s ambitions go beyond filtering; they are working on a project known as the National Internet. If implemented, this system would restrict Iranians to using only internal servers, effectively cutting them off from global platforms like Instagram and other foreign services and programs.

The prospect of a nationalized internet represents a significant escalation in the regime’s efforts to control the flow of information and further isolate the Iranian people from the outside world. As the regime continues to tighten its grip on cyberspace, the future of internet freedom in Iran remains uncertain, with potentially devastating consequences for the country’s digital landscape and its citizens’ rights.