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Is Iran’s Regime Losing Its Clout in The Middle East?

Iran regime's miscalculations in destabilizing the region and continuing proxy wars amid diminishing opportunities may jeopardize its existence.

In the span of less than 24 hours, the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) of the Iranian regime launched a series of missile strikes on the territories of Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan.

The regime justified these operations as a ‘revenge and severe response’ and a ‘show of authority.’

However, these actions have elicited strong regional and international reactions, including counter-military measures by Pakistan. The consequences for the regime may surpass the current level in the short term.

A critical question emerges in this context: Why did the Iranian regime undertake such operations when the Middle East is already on the brink of escalation with tensions rising daily?

The heightened regional tensions stem from the ongoing conflict in Gaza, which has contributed to the escalation of proxy actions involving Iranian-affiliated groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

These actions have drawn responses from Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom, collectively dealing significant blows to what the regime terms the ‘axis of resistance.’

Despite facing these setbacks, the regime refuses direct engagement with other countries, especially the US and Israel. It consistently claims that the actions of its proxy forces are independent decisions without direct interference.

One motivation behind these actions is to conceal the regime’s growing weakness, particularly after the widespread protests in 2022, which have eroded its legitimacy.

Additionally, the regime fears losing support both regionally and internally, a potentially fatal blow if domestic protests arise.

Simultaneously, recognizing its internal vulnerabilities and the risk of a larger conflict with the United States, the regime avoids direct confrontation with its perceived ‘enemies’ in the region.

Tehran is aware of its limitations and acknowledges that responding in such a manner may lead to a broader war.

Tehran’s concern about a potential Israeli attack on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon post the Gaza conflict reflects a strategic miscalculation.

The regime hoped that an event similar to 9/11 and previous Middle East wars would work once again in its favor, allowing it to neutralize its main opposition.

Losing Hezbollah’s military capabilities in Lebanon and their political influence in Beirut is a cost the regime cannot afford in the current situation.

The regime’s reluctance to actively involve Hezbollah in the Gaza conflict, relying instead on propaganda attacks, underscores its growing weakness, evident to the Iranian population.

Criticism of the regime extends beyond passive behaviors, reaching elements, officials, and media supporters in different Middle Eastern countries.

To alleviate pressure, the regime allowed Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea, viewed as a calculated move with limited risks of direct retaliation.

However, air and naval attacks by the US and UK against the Houthis questioned Tehran’s calculations, revealing the diminishing effectiveness of the appeasement policy.

The regime’s miscalculations in destabilizing the region and continuing proxy wars amid diminishing opportunities may jeopardize its existence.

In 2020, the regime’s promise of ‘severe revenge’ for the killing of Qassem Soleimani resulted in rocket attacks on Ain al-Assad, coordinated with the United States and posing no threat to American forces.

Questions persist among regime supporters about the absence of significant retaliation for Soleimani’s killers, highlighting internal dissatisfaction.

Supreme Leader Khamenei’s primary concern is a new uprising, perceiving potential sparks in every gathering and protest.

Despite attempts, he has not succeeded in quelling the spirit of change and the legitimate demands of the Iranian people, compounded by the unresolved challenges leading to the 2019 uprising.

Regime officials and media openly acknowledge the accumulating dissatisfaction and anger within society, warning of potential eruptions at opportune moments.

Khamenei’s preferred scenario was a short-term crisis to navigate internal problems, but the ongoing war and regional crises extend beyond his control, jeopardizing the regime’s stability.

Calls for confronting the regime and addressing the root causes of Middle East crises grow louder, reflecting the sentiment of those seeking to eliminate the source of instability.

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