Tehran gained some cash reserves to bolster their failing economy. However, the regime used much of the money to upgrade its military, instead of investing in its people. It has continued its crackdown on human rights.

In an article by Michael Tomlinson for iranlobby.net, he writes about a revelation disclosed last year by the Associated Press, of a “secret side deal that grants Iran an accelerated pathway to enriching uranium back to full capacity well before the 15-year time frame outlined in the deal.”

This would explain the accelerated development of Iran’s ballistic missile program we have witnessed recently. According to Tomlinson, “you can see the blueprint laid out by North Korea a decade earlier that enabled it to join the ranks of nuclear weaponized nations.”

A senior research fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, James Phillips, outlined the key failing in the nuclear deal in a piece in the Daily Signal. “The published text of the nuclear agreement was vague on the exact timing of what happens to Iran’s uranium enrichment program after ten years,” he writes. ““But the new document indicates that after ten years, Iran plans to start replacing its current centrifuges with thousands of more advanced models that would be up to five times more efficient than the 5,060 centrifuges that it is allowed to operate currently under the agreement.” He added, “This concession could allow Tehran to enrich at more than twice the rate that it is now doing, even if the total number of operating centrifuges are reduced. This is a major concern because if the enrichment rate doubles, the time Tehran would need to stage a nuclear breakout would be reduced from the 12 months promised by the Obama administration to six months or less, much earlier than the administration had advertised when it was trying to sell the nuclear deal.”

The alleged side deal was part of an add-on document that was prepared and submitted by the Iranian regime to the United Nations.

Tomlinson says that, “This poses a monumental problem for the future of the world in any new nuclear negotiations—not just with Iran, but any rogue nation…”

According to a Non-Resident Iran Research Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an FDD report points out that by appeasing the Iranian regime, the U.S. has set the precedents that “intransigence can lead the international community to accept domestic enrichment” and “that being a Western ally does not guarantee more flexible treatment when accessing nuclear technology.”

The unnamed Research Fellow continues, “Key American allies that have previously limited their nuclear activities—like South Korea or the United Arab Emirates—have already noted that Iran, which has been repeatedly sanctioned for its nuclear noncompliance, has been permitted to sign a deal allowing it to develop industrial-scale nuclear capacity.”

Tomlinson says that although the agreement is lengthy (159 pages) it is not always specific. There is a condition called “significant non-performance” under which parties can walk away from the JCPOA. Vague language may allow the Islamic State to define violations on its own terms.

Former deputy undersecretary of defense in the George H.W. Bush administration and a senior fellow of the London Center for Policy Research, Jed Babbin, noted in a piece in the Washington Times how the nuclear deal actually prevented international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities. “Parts of the side deals evidently bar Americans from participating in the inspection of Iranian nuclear sites. The side deals also allow Iran to inspect some of its own sites, preventing U.N. inspectors any access. To no one’s surprise, the Iranians have reported they are complying with the deal even in the uninspected sites,” he said, adding, “In 2003 Iraq, mistaken intelligence led to war. In 2016 Iran, the lack of intelligence is leading to a false peace.”