After many clashes between the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and its Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), the regime has finalized its decision to form a new organization called the “Command Corps for the Protection and Security of Nuclear Centers.”
Each of the regime’s security and military organizations accused their counterparts of showing weakness and negligence in dealing with the assaults against the regime’s nuclear facilities. Therefore, to end this debate and to close the security gaps, the regime decided to form a new organization, in the hope of preventing further attacks and acts of sabotage.
However, what the regime does not recognize is that security lapses are not due to its security organizations’ negligence, but because of its repressive and destructive nature, which has caused even many of its own elements to refuse to perform their duties and completely ignore the regime’s security.
This security confusion can be seen in the many statements of the regime’s media and its officials. Mohsen Rezaei, who currently serves as the Vice President of Iran for Economic Affairs, said that the country is suffering from “security infiltration”. Alireza Zakani, the current mayor of Tehran, said that Iran has become a “spy heaven.” Fereydoon Abbasi, the regime’s former head of the Atomic Energy Organization, unveiled the many attacks and acts of sabotage against the regime’s nuclear facilities.
The Mashreq News website, a media outlet affiliated with the IRGC, criticized the performance of the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and called for the control over such sections to be “Out of the management of governments,” while the state-run news agency Fars asked that “the security of the nuclear facilities should be handed over to the IRGC.”
In addition, there has been speculation about the formation of this new organization. While some of the regime’s media outlets have claimed that this decision was taken after the many blows against the regime’s nuclear facilities and key nuclear scientists, its intelligence organizations have shown substantial weakness to prevent such damage.
To provide an in-depth insight into the regime’s decision to form this organization, the following events are just a few of the blows that the regime has suffered from due to its security weakness: The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) revelation about Natanz uranium enrichment facility and Arak heavy water site in 2002, the theft of a laptop containing military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program in 2005, the revelation of Fordow underground facilities in 2009, the ‘Stuxnet’ virus attack against Natanz in 2010, the assassination of key nuclear scientists in 2006-2011, the theft of the Iranian nuclear archive and revelation of Torquzabad, Jaber Ebn Hyan’s laboratory in Lavizan and Marivan site in Abadeh in 2018, the explosion of Natanz centrifuge hall and the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020, and the explosion at the Natanz power facility in 2021.
Another, more potent reason for the formation of this organization is the regime’s decision to continue its suspicious and dangerous nuclear project, which is aiming to obtain a nuclear bomb. With the help of this organization, the regime will be able to close the gaps and intensify its secrecy, hiding many parts of its nuclear project from the eyes of the international community.
Regarding the regime’s efforts to rectify the security weakness, right after the formation of this organization, the state-run news agency Fars explained, “The network that wanted to sabotage the Fordow nuclear facility was arrested by the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization. The Nuclear Corps Command, in cooperation with the IRGC Counterintelligence Command, was able to prevent major sabotage of the country’s nuclear facilities by the network which tried to carry out its actions before the Nowruz holiday.”