Why Iranian society is rejecting both monarchy and theocracy after 120 years of authoritarian rule
To understand Iran’s current uprising, especially for those unfamiliar with the country’s history, it is essential to move beyond the idea that Iranians are merely seeking a change of leadership. What is unfolding is a demand to change the rules of governance themselves. After more than a century of repeated authoritarian failures, Iranian society is rejecting both monarchy and theocracy—the two political models that have dominated and damaged the country over the past 120 years.
Modern Iranian history begins with the Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century, when popular movements forced the creation of Iran’s first parliament and introduced the principle that political power should be limited by law. This was a foundational moment: Iranians demanded representation, accountability, and the rule of law. However, these gains were immediately challenged by entrenched power. The reigning monarch, backed by foreign interests, dissolved parliament by force, demonstrating how fragile democratic institutions can be when confronted by unchecked authority.
Although constitutional forces eventually restored the parliament, the system remained vulnerable. That vulnerability was fully exposed in 1921, when Reza Khan seized power in a military coup. This event, openly supported by Britain and opposed by democratic figures such as Mohammad Mossadegh, marked a decisive shift from constitutional governance to authoritarian rule. Political power moved from institutions to coercion. For two decades, Iran was governed by a centralized dictatorship designed more to serve foreign strategic interests than popular sovereignty. When those same powers later removed Reza Shah and replaced him with his son, the episode underscored how disconnected governance had become from the will of the people.
The most serious attempt to establish democratic rule came in the early 1950s under Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. His government represented a rare convergence of national independence and parliamentary democracy. Mossadegh’s efforts to assert control over Iran’s resources and strengthen democratic institutions were met with fierce resistance from external powers. A joint U.S.-British coup overthrew his government in 1953, reinstating monarchical authoritarianism. What followed was a quarter-century of political repression marked by censorship, imprisonment, and systematic torture.
The 1979 revolution was widely supported because it promised an end to dictatorship. Millions participated with hopes of freedom and self-determination. Yet the system that replaced the monarchy introduced a new form of absolute power: religious rule centered on clerical authority. Political pluralism was quickly suppressed. By the early 1980s, opposition groups were eliminated, and mass executions followed. Figures such as Mehdi Bazargan, Iran’s first post-revolution prime minister and a proponent of democratic governance, openly warned that replacing dictatorship without building democratic structures would only reproduce repression. His concerns proved prescient.
Since the early 2010s, Iran has experienced repeated waves of nationwide protests. Unlike earlier movements, these protests reflect a society that has learned from its past. Today’s demonstrators do not call for reform within authoritarian systems; they call for a structural break from them. This is why contemporary Iranian protest slogans and political discourse increasingly reject both hereditary rule and religious absolutism. The demand is not for a different ruler, but for a system where no ruler stands above the law.
This distinction is crucial. History shows that overthrowing a regime does not automatically produce democracy. Movements that rely on force, charisma, or external backing often replicate the same exclusionary practices once in power. Iranian political memory is shaped by this lesson. In internal discussions during the brutal repression of the 1980s, Mehdi Bazargan famously argued that any government unwilling to recognize the rights of its opponents would inevitably resort to violence to survive. A system that cannot tolerate dissent, regardless of ideology, remains authoritarian by definition.
This historical awareness informs today’s political divide. On one side are approaches centered on individual figures or nostalgic narratives, offering emotional certainty but no institutional safeguards. On the other are approaches that emphasize democratic procedures, secular governance, equality before the law, and protections for minorities. The latter reflects a conscious effort to avoid repeating the cycles that have repeatedly derailed Iran’s democratic aspirations.
Iranian society today is politically mature and deeply aware of the costs of authoritarian rule. Years of repression, corruption, and economic collapse have clarified the root problem: the concentration of unchecked power. Any future system that divides citizens into loyalists and enemies will face resistance from the same society that has already confronted both monarchy and theocracy.
What Iranians are demanding now is neither a return to the past nor a cosmetic change at the top. It is a redefinition of governance itself—one grounded in accountability, pluralism, and the acceptance of opposition as a legitimate and necessary part of political life.
