On May 25, Iran regime’s state-affiliated ILNA news agency reported that the Civil Aviation Organization had purchased two Airbus A330 aircraft from China for a staggering $116 million—despite each plane being valued at less than $30 million.
The deal, conducted under the guise of circumventing Western sanctions, highlights yet another case of opaque transactions and alleged profiteering by regime insiders.
This is not an isolated incident. Over the past decade, numerous reports in both Iranian and international media have exposed how Iranian regime officials and their associates have leveraged sanctions as an opportunity for personal gain.
One of the most infamous examples is Ali Shamkhani, a top advisor to the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who, along with his children, reportedly accumulated vast wealth through clandestine oil sales.
A Suspicious Transaction
The arrival of the two Airbus planes was officially announced on May 24, with authorities stating that the aircraft were added to Iran Air’s (Homa) fleet. Mehrdad Bazrpash, then Minister of Roads and Urban Development under Ebrahim Raisi’s administration, had first teased the acquisition in April, claiming it had been initiated by the previous government.
However, ILNA’s investigation revealed a different story. The planes were obtained through a barter arrangement with an obscure Chinese firm named Hakan Energy, in exchange for Iranian oil. The report noted with concern that “each aircraft, worth less than $30 million, was traded for oil valued at $116 million.”
Hakan Energy, according to ILNA, has a murky track record. During the previous administration, it was awarded projects worth billions—including a $2.5 billion second-phase development plan for Imam Khomeini International Airport—in exchange for oil purchases.
Experts at the time warned that the figures were exorbitantly inflated. Eventually, Hakan abandoned the airport project and failed to deliver on other commitments, such as electrifying the Tehran-Mashhad railway, procuring rail wagons, and importing additional aircraft.
Despite a supposed agreement to supply 55 aircraft, only two have been delivered—at double their market value.
Corruption Under the Cloak of Sanctions
The scandal unfolds amid growing criticism of Farzaneh Sadegh, the current Roads and Urban Development Minister, over her and her family’s state-funded luxury trip to Kish Island and a 61 trillion toman contract with Babak Zanjani’s controversial enterprise. Yet ILNA emphasized that the Airbus deal was signed under Bazrpash’s leadership, just before his departure from office. He has since defended the move as an effort to facilitate private-sector aircraft imports.
What remains unanswered is why Sadegh chose not to cancel or renegotiate a deal so evidently skewed against Iran’s national interest.
A System Built on Exploitation
While regime officials frequently blame Western sanctions for widespread poverty among ordinary Iranians, deals like the Airbus transaction tell a different story. Behind the scenes, a network of state-affiliated brokers, security institutions, and so-called private firms appear to be profiting immensely from the very sanctions they publicly denounce.
Experts argue that, under normal circumstances, used Airbus aircraft could have been procured on the open market for under $30 million each. But in a system lacking transparency and accountability—where oil-for-goods barter deals are orchestrated in secrecy—the main beneficiaries are intermediaries closely linked to centers of power.
Since the early 2010s, when sanctions intensified, organizations like the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order, and various religious foundations have dominated Iran’s parallel economy.
Framed as efforts to bypass sanctions, their activities have fueled systemic corruption and created a new class of “sanctions profiteers.” These actors, with direct influence over policymaking, have every incentive to maintain the status quo.
The Case of Ali Shamkhani
Perhaps the most striking example of this dynamic is the immense and inexplicable wealth amassed by Ali Shamkhani and his family. Numerous credible media outlets—including Reuters, Bloomberg, and Al Arabiya—have detailed how the Shamkhanis have enriched themselves through secret oil deals, opaque barter arrangements with East Asian firms, and other financial maneuvers designed to obscure the true beneficiaries.
What these revelations confirm is that sanctions have not merely failed to curb the regime’s power—they have been repurposed as a lucrative business model for Iran’s ruling elite.
Conclusion
The Airbus deal is not just a case of financial mismanagement or bad judgment; it is emblematic of a broader, deeply entrenched system of corruption. Under the pretext of economic resistance and self-reliance, regime insiders continue to exploit national crises for personal enrichment—while ordinary Iranians bear the brunt of poverty and isolation.
As long as this corrupt infrastructure remains in place, sanctions will serve not as a deterrent, but as an enabler of elite privilege and systemic looting.
