State media narratives reveal the clerical regime’s long-standing confrontation with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, drawing explicit parallels between the 1980s repression and the January 2026 nationwide uprising.
In a revealing broadcast aired on January 25, 2026, Iran’s state television once again underscored what has been a central reality since the establishment of the Mullahs regime: the regime’s defining political and security confrontation is with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).
The program—presented as a documentary and produced by Javad Moghouli, a filmmaker closely associated with Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus—openly framed the January 2026 nationwide uprising as a continuation of the resistance that began shortly after the 1979 revolution, particularly during the repression of the 1980s.
“Almost an Exact Replica of the 1980s”
One of the most striking moments in the broadcast came during an exchange aired by state TV, in which a question was posed comparing recent events to the early years of the Mullahs regime.
Asked how similar the current situation is to the conditions of the 1980s, Morteza Mirdar, introduced as a researcher and university professor, replied:
“It was almost an exact replica.”
Mirdar went further, stating that the same patterns were reappearing, alleging that opponents of the regime seek to portray themselves as victims and the state as a perpetrator of violence. Regardless of intent, the comparison itself constitutes an explicit admission that the regime sees the 2026 uprising through the lens of its original conflict with the PMOI, rather than as an isolated or purely socio-economic protest.
State Media Revisits the Origins of Resistance
The broadcast repeatedly returned to the early post-revolutionary period, tracing what it described as the evolution of the PMOI from its founding years into an organized resistance movement. A state TV reporter declared that the “story” begins in 1966, insisting that what is shown “is not fiction, but reality preserved on the walls,” referring to an exhibition promoted by Tehran’s municipality.
Throughout the program, regime-affiliated journalists and commentators—including Harir Adeli and Sara Houshmandi—used familiar state terminology to accuse the PMOI of responsibility for violence in the 1980s. Houshmandi claimed that:
“Many of the events since 1981 in the Islamic Republic… are now being implemented again in the recent unrest, using the same methods.”
Such statements, aired without dissenting voices, nonetheless reveal the regime’s own perception: that today’s unrest is not spontaneous, temporary, or marginal, but part of a historical continuum of organized resistance.
From 1980s Repression to the 2026 Uprising
The program also revisited Operation Forough Javidan (1988) and the subsequent crackdown, reinforcing the idea that the regime views moments of mass unrest primarily through a security lens shaped by its confrontation with the PMOI.
Javad Moghouli, presented as a “historical researcher,” claimed that PMOI supporters even targeted schools in the early 1980s—assertions long used to justify mass executions and widespread repression. These allegations were reiterated as justification for the regime’s narrative of having faced an existential threat from its earliest years.
The exhibition highlighted in the broadcast, organized with the involvement of the Tehran Municipality and displayed at Khavaran Cultural Center, culminates in what officials refer to as the “Mersad phase,” again anchoring current events to past military and security campaigns.
The Significance of the Regime’s Own Narrative
Perhaps most revealing was a rhetorical question posed by a state TV reporter:
“When we speak of 17,000 victims of terror, what are we talking about?”
By framing the discussion this way, the regime implicitly acknowledges that its legitimacy narrative—and its justification for decades of repression—remains inseparable from its conflict with the PMOI.
Rather than diminishing the importance of the January 2026 uprising, the broadcast confirms that Iranian authorities view it as part of the same unresolved struggle that began in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution. More than four decades later, the regime’s own media admits that its primary “enemy” remains not foreign powers, but an organized domestic opposition it has failed to eliminate.
In doing so, Iranian state television unintentionally highlights a central fact of the country’s political reality: the endurance of resistance, and the persistence of a conflict that continues to shape the regime’s response to every nationwide uprising.
