A sweeping proposed law could criminalize contact with foreign media, restrict civil society and universities, and place broad areas of cultural and social activity under security control.
The Iranian regime is moving toward a new and potentially far-reaching instrument of repression that could give its security apparatus broader powers to criminalize ordinary contact with the outside world and suppress independent activity inside the country.
On August 16, the regime’s parliament approved the general framework of a bill officially described as a measure to “counter the infiltration of intelligence services and foreign governments or institutions.” The vote was overwhelmingly in favor, with 183 lawmakers supporting the measure, four opposing it, and five abstaining.
The bill has not yet become law. Its individual articles must still be debated and approved, and the legislation would subsequently have to pass the regime’s remaining legal procedures. However, the approval of its general framework is a significant warning: the regime’s parliament has endorsed the principle of creating a much broader legal framework for treating a wide range of social, professional, cultural, academic, and media activities as potential “infiltration.”
From Espionage to Criminalizing Contact With the Outside World
The most alarming aspect of the proposed legislation is its extremely broad definition of what constitutes “infiltration.”
Unlike conventional espionage laws, which generally focus on obtaining or transferring classified security information, the published draft extends criminal liability to activities that have little or no connection to espionage.
One proposed provision would prohibit interviews, participation in discussions, or other forms of communication with media outlets designated by the regime as “hostile.” It would also require contacts with other foreign media to be registered through a system controlled by the Ministry of Intelligence.
Another provision would criminalize sending photographs, videos, audio recordings, or other data to foreign media or people working in media outside Iran. If the authorities classify circumstances as a “crisis,” “unrest,” or “riot,” the proposed penalties would become more severe.
This provision could potentially place ordinary citizens at risk. A person who records a protest, labor strike, security crackdown, or other public event and sends the material to a foreign media outlet could potentially fall within the scope of the proposed law.
Civil Society and Universities in the Crosshairs
The proposed restrictions extend well beyond journalism.
The draft would prohibit individuals from providing information, reports, or statistics to foreign institutions or foreign nationals without authorization from the Ministry of Intelligence. The language is not explicitly limited to classified information, raising concerns that ordinary professional or academic exchanges could become prosecutable offenses.
Civil society organizations, associations, political groups, and NGOs could also face severe restrictions. Receiving financial assistance, contracts, commissions, or other benefits from foreign embassies or institutions without government authorization could result not only in imprisonment and fines, but potentially the dissolution of organizations and bans preventing their directors from cultural or social activities for years.
The academic sphere would similarly be brought under tighter security supervision. The Ministry of Intelligence would determine which foreign universities and institutions are considered acceptable for scholarships, contracts, or scientific events. Cooperation with institutions outside the approved list could potentially result in criminal penalties.
Even contacts between individuals or organizations and foreign embassies or institutions could require notification and written authorization under the proposed framework.
Culture and Education Could Become Security Offenses
The bill also reaches into Iran’s cultural and educational life.
The proposed provisions cover films, television series, documentaries, theater, music, books, training courses, and workshops. Cultural works allegedly produced with foreign support could be punished if authorities claim that they portray Iran negatively, challenge religious doctrines, or conflict with the regime’s definition of Iranian culture.
Security authorities could even seek to halt a cultural production before it is completed.
Training courses, including online programs, could likewise become subject to criminal prosecution under broadly defined circumstances. Participants could potentially be punished if authorities determine that they were aware of the organizers’ alleged objectives.
The draft also proposes criminal penalties for cooperation with foreign institutions concerning certain international agreements and programs.
A New Weapon Against Dissent
The significance of the bill lies precisely in its expansion of the concept of “infiltration.” The regime already possesses extensive laws dealing with espionage and national security. The proposed legislation seeks to create an additional and much broader category in which ordinary social and political activities can be brought under criminal law.
Terms such as “hostile media,” “portraying a negative image of Iran,” “incompatible with Iranian culture,” and “undermining public trust in the system” appear in the published text without sufficiently precise legal definitions.
Such vague terminology gives security institutions enormous discretion to determine what constitutes a crime.
That is particularly dangerous in a country where the regime has repeatedly responded to nationwide protests with mass arrests, torture, forced confessions, executions, and sweeping restrictions on freedom of expression.
The Warning Cannot Be Ignored
Even some lawmakers have expressed concern about the bill’s breadth, questioning why another expansive security law is necessary when numerous existing laws already criminalize espionage and cooperation deemed hostile to the regime.
But the regime’s leadership is seeking precisely this expansion. By redefining “infiltration” to encompass media contacts, civil society, academic cooperation, cultural production, educational activities, and communication with foreign institutions, it would potentially create a new legal framework for policing society.
The bill has not yet become law, and its provisions may still be amended. But the parliamentary vote on its general framework demonstrates the regime’s direction of travel.
At a time when Iranian society is already facing intensified repression and protesters remain at risk of arrest, torture, and execution, the international community must recognize this legislation as an urgent warning.
Governments, the United Nations, and international human rights organizations should closely monitor the bill’s progress and publicly demand that it not be used to criminalize peaceful expression, journalism, civil society, academic exchange, or communication with the outside world.
The regime should not be allowed to transform the concept of “foreign infiltration” into a legal pretext for placing an entire society under permanent security control.