A massive explosion and fire at Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas has raised serious concerns about unregulated shipments, opaque port operations, and the involvement of powerful military-linked institutions. Days after the incident, which caused widespread damage and claimed multiple lives, Iranian officials have yet to provide a clear explanation for the source of the explosion or the nature of the cargo involved.
According to a statement from Iran’s Customs Authority, the shipment that caused the fire was not registered in the organization’s systems and had not passed through official customs channels. This revelation suggests the existence of an illicit and highly dangerous cargo that entered one of the country’s most strategically sensitive ports without oversight.
Who Bypassed Customs?
The central question now confronting the public is this: Who has the authority and means to bypass customs and bring hazardous materials into a port of national importance?
Many eyes have turned toward the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a powerful military and economic force in Iran. The IRGC operates an extensive network of front companies and both official and covert institutions, including operations at Rajaee Port itself.
Former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, during his time in office, infamously referred to “unauthorized docks” controlled by this institution, describing their operators as “our smuggling brothers.” His statement continues to resonate today, especially in the wake of the Bandar Abbas incident.
A Curtain of Censorship
Three days after the explosion, no government agency has clarified where exactly the fire began or what cargo triggered the blast. State media coverage has been heavily censored, and independent reporting on the issue has been suppressed.
Saeed Jafari, CEO of the Sina Maritime and Port Services Development Company, stated that the explosion occurred on company premises. The company is a subsidiary of the Mostazafan Foundation—an economic conglomerate controlled by Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan, a senior IRGC commander and former defense minister.
The Defense Ministry has denied that any military cargo was stored at the port. However, experts argue that this could be a semantic loophole: chemicals such as sodium perchlorate, which is suspected to have caused the fire, are not officially classified as “military” until processed into rocket fuel.
Tracking the Chemical Trail
Recent reports confirm that two Iranian vessels, Jeyran and Golbon, brought nearly 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate into Bandar Abbas in recent months. The key question remains: where were these dangerous materials unloaded and stored?
While the Customs Authority maintains that the cargo was outside its jurisdiction, the Sina Company has acknowledged that the explosion occurred at its site and has not denied the presence of sodium perchlorate.
This raises another critical question: How was the Mostazafan Foundation able to import and store hazardous substances without customs clearance?
Though unanswered officially, the foundation’s deep-rooted ties to the IRGC offer a likely explanation. The Mostazafan Foundation has long functioned as a financial arm of the regime’s military apparatus—facilitating, for instance, the payment of salaries to Liwa Fatemiyoun militia fighters via Bank Sina, another entity under its control.
A Military Monopoly
Since 2014, Terminal No. 2 of Rajaee Port—where the explosion occurred—has been operated exclusively by the Sina Port Company, a Mostazafan affiliate. This terminal spans nearly 90,000 hectares and serves as a key hub for containerized imports.
Rajaee Port is divided between two major operators: Terminal One, managed by Beta Company, and Terminal Two, overseen by Sina. The incident occurred entirely within the domain controlled by the Mostazafan Foundation.
In addition to port management, the foundation also exerts significant influence over maritime logistics through companies like Paya Tarabar Sina, which owns multiple cargo vessels importing goods from China. The CEO of this holding is also on the board of the Shipowners’ Union, underscoring the foundation’s integrated control over Iran’s import infrastructure.
A Pattern of Military Obfuscation
This structural entanglement of the IRGC with economic and logistical assets is further highlighted by the involvement of top military figures in the post-blast response. Interior Minister Brigadier General Eskandar Momeni traveled to the site and announced the summoning of some individuals in connection with the blast. Other senior IRGC-linked figures—Brigadier General Hossein Sajedinia, head of the Crisis Management Organization, and Brigadier General Pourjamshidian of the Interior Ministry—are also managing the fallout.
This overwhelming military presence before, during, and after the incident points to the deep institutional role the IRGC plays in the port’s operations—and in the crisis itself.
A National Tragedy, A Structural Crisis
As families grieve and search for missing loved ones, media and internet users face legal threats for sharing information. The tragedy at Rajaee Port is not an isolated accident; it is a stark reflection of the broader crisis in Iran’s governance—where critical infrastructure is controlled by unaccountable military institutions operating in legal grey zones.
The Bandar Abbas fire brings back painful memories of other disasters, such as the 2003 Neyshabur train explosion that involved ammonium nitrate being transported near IRGC and Ministry of Defense missile bases. That case, too, was shrouded in secrecy, and no credible explanation was ever offered.
What happened at Rajaee Port is more than a catastrophic fire—it is a vivid illustration of how Iran’s most powerful security institutions operate outside civilian oversight, shielded by censorship, and enabled by the very structure of the regime.
