Iran regime’s ballistic missile arsenal is the largest and most capable in the Middle East, with the ability to accurately strike anywhere in the region, including Israel and Eastern Europe. Despite decades of UN sanctions aimed at containing the regime’s industrial military capacity, Iran ranks sixth in the world for missile production, according to its own Ministry of Defense.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force is Iran’s strategic missile force, with an estimated 15,000 soldiers dedicated to missile operations. The force was founded in 1985, but its roots trace back to 1979 when Iran was reorganizing its military after the Iranian Revolution.
Iran’s ballistic missile development began in earnest during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) when Iraq launched an invasion targeting major Iranian urban areas with Scud ballistic missiles.
Iran retaliated in kind with Scud missiles of their own in an exchange known as The War of the Cities. These major missile exchanges lasted the entire course of the war, prompting Iran to develop missiles of their own to try to beat Iraq at the missile game.
Iran got a head start on their missile development by adopting foreign-supplied rockets and building their own versions.
The Soviet Union wasn’t interested in supporting Iran during its war with Iraq, but the People’s Republic of China and North Korea were more than willing to play ball.
Many of Iran’s early missiles are based on Chinese or North Korean rockets, and the practice of adapting East Asian missiles into current Iranian-produced versions continues today.
Supporting Iran allowed China and North Korea to secure some much-needed influence on the global stage. Iran’s regime badly needed allies as well, and the bloody war with their neighbor Iraq reinforced the lesson that they needed a strong deterrent against future aggression.
Ballistic missiles are particularly attractive to developing militaries like Iran because they’re a cheap form of force projection compared to a large air force or navy.
They allow a country to threaten to strike far from their borders without much required training, and it’s hard for defenders to stop them.
As the country’s technology and military-industrial level increase over time, their missiles naturally evolve in range, accuracy, and payload.
For example, the first missiles Iran produced like the Aab only had a range of about 30 km, but by 1987, Iran was producing its own version of the Soviet Scud B called the Shahab 1 with a range of 300 km.
Iran would fire the Shahab 1 into Iraq several times in the 1990s. Shahab missiles have long been at the core of Iran’s missile program and use liquid fuel for energy.
They involve a time-consuming launch process, which is one weakness of the Shahab missiles. It takes a long time to set up, fuel, and launch, making them vulnerable to air strikes.
In the 1990s, Iran developed the improved Shahab 2 missile with a range of 500 km. Iran is believed to have around 300 of these two missile types in their arsenal today.
Iran wouldn’t fire any missiles in anger during the early 2000s at least not directly, but they continued to research and develop more reliable missiles with better range and accuracy.
This includes their anti-ship guided missiles like the Kowsar series. In the 2006 war in Lebanon, Hezbollah heavily damaged two Israeli warships 16 km off the coast and killed four Israeli crewmen using these missiles.
Iran was truly becoming the one-stop shop for all the missile needs of militant groups. The Shahab 3, first tested in 1998 and put into service in 2003, based on North Korean technology.
Its warhead weighs about 1 ton, giving it about the same size payload as one of America’s JDAM precision-guided air strike missiles. This modification gave it a range of 1,600 km, which means it qualifies as a medium-range missile.
This puts NATO members Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania within striking range if it was fired from Western Iran.
Through its proxies, Iran received combat reports on how their weapons were performing in the field, funneling that data back to their R&D programs to develop new types of missiles for both conventional and asymmetric warfare.
This is a key term referred to as battle damage assessment in the military. In 2008, Iran unveiled its Sejjil 2-stage solid propellant missile, which has a re-entry speed of more than five times the speed of sound, making it difficult to target and intercept with air defense systems.
Sejjil missiles are unique because they’re the first ones not based on prior North Korean technology and present more challenges to global security.
This is because solid fuel missiles can be launched from a mobile launcher and with less notice than the Shahab liquid-fueled missiles, making them tough to target and strike prior to launch.
Iran’s missile force is well-trained and equipped with precision-guided munitions. The IRGC Aerospace Force has about 15,000 soldiers dedicated to their missile operations.
Recently the regime staged a public billboard written in Persian, Arabic, and Hebrew showing their new hypersonic missile and saying “400 seconds to Tel Aviv.”
The IRGC Aerospace Force was founded in 1985, but its roots trace back to 1979 when Iran was reorganizing its military after the Iranian Revolution.
Iran’s regime has been under a series of sanctions for years, mainly targeting its nuclear program, but also aimed at severely restricting the kind of military-industrial development that would allow for advanced guidance systems, new rocket fuels and engines that are required for the types of missiles that the regime is developing.
The US first levied sanctions against Iran in 1979 as a result of the Iranian Revolution that ousted the US government, but other countries and the United Nations have added to the growing list of embargoes against the country over the years as a result of Iran’s backing of international terror groups and its contribution to global arms proliferation.
These various sanctions packages also target Iran’s oil exports, trade of consumer and electronic goods, and Iranian shipping and transport industries. Cut off from most international markets, Iran regime’s economy has suffered tremendously.
The regime’s economy has had numerous recessions since 2000, with inflation reaching as much as 40% at its peak in 2014 and unemployment around 20%.
A 2015 US Treasury report estimated that restrictions on oil exports had cost Iran $140 billion worth of lost oil revenue, and the country’s economy was 15-20% smaller than it would have been as a result of the latest tightening of sanctions that hit in 2012.
Over $100 billion worth of financial assets are frozen in foreign countries and are major leverage for the United States and the European Union when trying to bring the regime to the negotiating table about their missile program.
While the regime has suffered deep wounds to its economy, the sanctions haven’t affected its military and missile programs as much as intended. For one, Iran has adapted to living with sanctions and going without many modern amenities.
The regime and its police forces have also gone a long way in threatening the people to not complain about a lack of even the most basic needs. Secondly, the regime has invented clever ways to evade sanctions by exploiting third-party countries and black markets.
Iran has established shadowy banking networks in the UAE and Hong Kong, where local governments are less likely to cooperate with Western authorities like the United States.
In March 2023, the United States sanctioned 39 companies for helping Iran get around the financial and banking restrictions that are supposed to keep its cash flow in the red. Many of Iran’s industries are state-owned, and they establish shell companies abroad to hide their true ownership.
This means that every barrel of oil they’re able to sell and every gold bar they’re able to transfer are funneled directly into regime’s coffers. It also means that Iran’s state-run defense industries can’t say no to a contract, even if it would be unprofitable in a more market-driven economy.
This complex network of front companies and false registrations is also one of the main reasons the regime is able to get its hands on specialty items it needs for its missile programs.
Iran’s missile program has continued to evolve and improve, with the development of new missiles such as the Ghadr-1, a medium-range ballistic missile first unveiled in 2007.
The Ghadr-1 has a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, putting it in the same class as the Shahab-3. It is believed to be more accurate and have a larger payload capacity than the Shahab-3, and it is also faster to prepare for launch.
In 2015, the regime unveiled the Emad, a new precision-guided ballistic missile with a range of 1,700 kilometers. The Emad is believed to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, though the regime has denied this.
In 2016, the regime tested the Khorramshahr, a ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers that is capable of carrying multiple warheads.
The regime’s ballistic missile program has been a source of concern for the international community for many years. In 2010, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the regime over its ballistic missile program, and in 2015, those sanctions were strengthened as part of the nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers. However, the regime has continued to develop its missile program, despite these sanctions.
One reason for the regime’s continued focus on its missile program is its strategic location. Iran is surrounded by hostile neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States.
Its missile program is seen as a way to deter any potential aggression from these countries. Iran has also been involved in proxy wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and its missiles are seen as a way to project power and influence in the region.
Iran’s ballistic missile program also has a domestic dimension. The IRGC, which controls the missile program, is a powerful political and economic force in Iran.
The missile program is seen as a source of pride and nationalism for many Iranians, and it is used to rally support for the regime.
The IRGC has also used the missile program to generate revenue, through the sale of missiles and related technology to other countries.
Despite the concerns of the international community, Iran shows no signs of slowing down its ballistic missile program. In February 2020, Iran unveiled a new ballistic missile, the Raad-500, with a range of 500 kilometers.
The Raad-500 is a solid-fuel missile, which makes it faster to launch and harder to detect than liquid-fuel missiles. Iran has also announced plans to develop a new cruise missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers.
The United States has responded to Iran’s ballistic missile program with sanctions and military pressure. In January 2020, the United States carried out a drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force.
The United States also imposed new sanctions on Iran’s missile program in September 2020, targeting individuals and entities involved in the development and production of ballistic missiles.
However, it is clear that these measures will not be enough to deter the regime from continuing to develop its ballistic missile program.
Iran has shown a willingness to endure economic hardship in order to maintain its military capabilities, and it is unlikely to abandon its missile program anytime soon even at the cost of the people’s increasing impoverishment.
The international community will need to find a way to address the underlying security concerns that drive the regime’s missile development, while also finding ways to constrain the program and prevent the proliferation of missile technology to other countries in the region.
