Less than two months before Iran’s parliamentary elections, the regime’s Guardian Council sealed the fate of disqualifications.
This process was evident from the outset. The regime aimed to purge any dissenting voices against its rule from the election atmosphere, allowing only those with unwavering allegiance to the regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei to enter the parliament.
And the dictatorial rule’s nature did not even tolerate the outer circle of its supporters. This discernible purification procedure appeared for the first time with the 2018 elections, resulting in the parliament being dubbed the ‘revolutionary parliament’ by Khamenei.
The elimination of the so-called reformist faction had unforeseen consequences for the Mullahs. While eliminating the so-called reformist faction, present since Mohammad Khatami’s presidency in 1997, the regime faced societal reactions, notably in the form of protests in 2018, 2020, and 2022.
In the 2021 presidential election, Khamenei didn’t spare Ali Larijani, a long-trusted speaker, for his selected parliament.
After the elections, the isolation and boycott of the election intensified contradictions within the dominant faction. The conflict between the ‘Revolutionary parliament’ and the ‘Young Hezbollahi government’ escalated, proving irreconcilable contrary to the Mullahs’ expectations.
The bigger goal was the unification of power for the impending wave of protests, which had already begun sequentially. The conflict was so severe that many regime officials, elements, and media discussed the ‘purification‘ of the government in line with Khamenei’s intentions.
People’s opinions were no longer the criterion; the goal was preventing anyone with the slightest objection to the regime from reaching the pinnacle of power.
The 2022 protests prompted leaders and senior military commanders to acknowledge the decline, a rarity before but abundant during the 2022 protests.
The only left solution for the Mullahs’ regime is to disqualify or remove anyone expressing even the slightest opposition. This is a fundamental law in the demise of dictatorships.
In a peculiar move, the regime’s Guardian Council spokesman confirmed the disqualification of 26 current parliament members. He also announced the approval of over 11,000 candidates for the parliament.
Some believe Khamenei’s recent words about promoting parliamentary elections aim to give it a competitive appearance by approving qualifications for several figures and some current parliament members.
The regime’s ‘illegitimacy’ in the people’s eyes led Khamenei to threaten that non-participation in the elections is ‘opposition to Islam.’ He stated, “‘Elections are a duty, and anyone opposing them opposes the Islamic Republic and Islam.’
Most people believe the chance to reform corruption and tyranny in Iran through the ballot box has ended. The 2022 popular uprising not only eroded the system’s legitimacy, fueling the desire for overthrow, especially among the youth, but also exposed the inefficiency of the regime project to purify its ranks in hopes of controlling all affairs.
Losing faith in reforming the regime caused many figures of the so-called reformist faction and some reformist parties to abstain from electoral activities and registration in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
President Ebrahim Raisi’s attempt to reconcile all currents within the regime by inviting political party figures ended up intensifying disputes and tensions, contrary to organizers’ claims. This echoed the slogan ‘reformist, principlists, your time is over,’ chanted during protests in 2018, 2020, and the 2022 popular uprising.
So far, news about parliamentary elections hasn’t generated competitive excitement, even among traditional regime supporters. Despite some polling institutes insisting on over 30% participation, the current situation indicates none of the regime’s actions have yielded the desired results, and none will increase people’s participation.
When asked about his candidacy, Mahmoud Alavi, the regime’s former Minister of Intelligence, admitted that ‘the participation percentage for Tehran in the upcoming elections is expected to be between 8 and 10 percent.’
This potential decrease in participation signals the people’s desire to end this regime, angering Khamenei and his supporters even before the elections.
