As executions rise and officials openly link survival to conflict, a long-standing doctrine re-emerges: external war as a tool for internal control
The execution of three prisoners—Mehdi Rasouli, Mohammadreza Miri, and Ebrahim Dowlatabadi—on Monday, May 4, in Mashhad is not an isolated judicial act. It is a calibrated political signal. Accused of involvement in the killing of Basij members during unrest, their hangings serve a broader purpose: reinforcing a climate of fear at a moment when the ruling establishment feels increasingly vulnerable.
For months, evidence has pointed to a pattern. Under the cover of external tensions and wartime conditions, the Iranian regime authorities have accelerated the use of capital punishment. The objective is not merely punitive; it is preventative—deterring the resurgence of organized dissent and containing what officials describe as “rebellious networks.”
What distinguishes the current moment, however, is not just the escalation of repression, but the candor with which regime insiders now articulate its underlying logic. Statements published by state-affiliated outlets leave little room for interpretation. One official, Gholamreza Qasemian, was quoted as declaring that “God has willed this war for us,” framing continued conflict not as a contingency, but as a necessity. The implication is stark: whether embraced with “honor” or endured without it, war remains indispensable.
This framing goes further. Qasemian openly lamented the temporary ceasefire, expressing a desire for renewed hostilities. In his words, Iran’s fate is defined “in these wars,” and in a condition of “neither war nor peace,” the system gains nothing. Such remarks are not rhetorical excess—they reflect a strategic doctrine in which perpetual tension is preferable to stability.
This is not a new doctrine. Years earlier, Javad Mansouri, a founding figure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, acknowledged the formative role of the Iran-Iraq war in consolidating the regime’s power. He stated plainly that without the war, the revolution might not have survived. According to Mansouri, the conflict provided the structure, legitimacy, and momentum necessary to suppress internal opposition and neutralize dissenting factions.
Taken together, these statements reveal continuity rather than deviation. War, in this framework, is not an external crisis imposed on the system—it is an instrument deliberately leveraged to preserve it. By sustaining an environment of confrontation, the state justifies heightened security measures, restricts political space, and marginalizes dissent under the banner of national survival.
The recent executions must therefore be read within this broader architecture. They are not simply reactions to past actions, but preemptive measures against future unrest. At a time when socioeconomic pressures, political fragmentation, and public discontent are intensifying, the leadership appears to be reverting to a familiar mechanism: escalate externally to control internally.
In contrast, opposition voices continue to advance an alternative trajectory. Speaking at a conference in the European Union, Maryam Rajavi, the President-elect of the National Council of Resistance emphasized that from the outset of the recent conflict, the movement has advocated for peace and freedom. Following the announcement of a ceasefire, it welcomed the development while underscoring that durable peace requires structural change—specifically, the end of religious authoritarian rule and the establishment of a democratic republic.
This divergence highlights the central fault line in Iran’s current trajectory. On one side stands a governing model that equates survival with perpetual conflict. On the other, a vision that ties stability to political transformation.
The executions in Mashhad, and the rhetoric surrounding them, suggest that the balance is not shifting quietly. It is being contested—forcefully, and with rising stakes.
