Given the ongoing periodic meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it appears that the Iranian regime has taken preemptive measures to forestall the issuance of a resolution and referral of its case to the Security Council.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement reached in 2015 between the Iranian regime and world powers, aimed to impose restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program while lifting economic sanctions against the regime. Notably, a significant provision of the JCPOA was the removal of Iran’s arms and missile restrictions in October 2023.
However, the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 and the failure to reach an agreement with the Biden administration to revive it have cast doubt on achieving the JCPOA goals by 2025. Without an agreement, there is a possibility that world powers may invoke the trigger mechanism, leading to the reinstatement of previous Security Council resolutions against the Iranian regime.
In the interim, the IAEA reports that the Iranian regime has amassed enough 60% enriched uranium to produce three nuclear bombs. However, converting this uranium into a weapon requires additional steps such as enriching it to 90% and constructing an explosive detonator and delivery system.
Recently, a telephone conversation between the Iranian regime’s Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of Qatar hinted at a potential exchange of messages between Tehran and the US government mediated by Qatar to resolve the JCPOA issue.
The Iranian regime’s apparent reduction in uranium enrichment to 60% can be interpreted in this context. Some Western analysts also speculate about the possibility of a new agreement between the regime and the US government through unofficial channels.
Iran’s nuclear program has long been a contentious issue, with the regime asserting its peaceful intentions while many countries suspect it seeks to acquire nuclear weapons.
The lack of transparency and cooperation with the IAEA has been a significant point of contention. The Iranian regime has consistently withheld complete and accurate information about its nuclear activities from the IAEA and restricted access to certain nuclear sites.
Moreover, it has repeatedly violated its obligations under the JCPOA by increasing uranium enrichment levels, expanding enriched uranium reserves, installing new centrifuges, refusing to address IAEA inquiries about past nuclear activities, and denying agency inspectors access to some nuclear sites.
These actions have heightened international concerns about the prospect of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, escalating regional tensions and the risk of military conflict.
The IAEA has issued warnings regarding the Iranian regime’s escalating stockpiles of enriched uranium, which now exceed the limits set by the JCPOA by 27 times.
According to the agency’s latest report, as of February 10, Iran’s total enriched uranium reserves, spanning various concentrations, have surpassed 5,525 kilograms, marking an increase of 1,380 kilograms compared to the previous report in November.
Matthew Miller, spokesperson for the US State Department, expressed concern over the ongoing expansion of the Iranian regime’s nuclear program, particularly the production of highly enriched uranium, which he deemed to serve no legitimate civilian purpose.
Similarly, Abram Paley, US Deputy Special Envoy for Iran, emphasized the Iranian regime’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA during a meeting with Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA.
These statements come amid stalled negotiations to revive the JCPOA and escalating tensions between the regime and the West. There is a possibility of a resolution being issued in the Board of Governors and Iran’s case being referred to the UN Security Council.
With the expiration of Resolution 2231’s restrictions in October 2025, the West must take proactive measures, as Iran’s nuclear program will then fall outside the purview of the Security Council, potentially granting immediate access to nuclear weapons by the regime. Hence, it appears that the remaining 1.5 years before the resolution’s expiration will pose greater challenges for the regime in the Board of Governors meetings.
Even if a solution to trigger the mechanism is elusive for the US, one of the European troika members may activate this process if the regime fails to meet global expectations. From this perspective, the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting holds significant importance.
