The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its quarterly report on November 13, 2023, detailing the verification and monitoring of the Iranian regime’s nuclear commitments. A comprehensive evaluation of this report, along with the data from a separate November 15 report on the NPT Safeguard Agreement with Iran’s regime, was conducted by the Institute for Science and International Security.
The report illuminates alarming facts concerning the Iranian regime’s nuclear capabilities. It discloses the regime’s possession of a stockpile of enriched uranium and its capacity to produce weapons-grade uranium through centrifuges. This capability is disconcerting, projecting the potential to manufacture six nuclear bombs in one month, eight in two months, 10 in three months, 11 in four months, and 12 in five months. Notably, the nuclear escape capability of the regime surges significantly from the third to the fifth month, primarily attributed to the continuous growth of the enriched uranium stockpile, while the capacity of centrifuges remains relatively constant.
As Iran gains more experience, the regime can produce the initial 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium within seven days, utilizing only a fraction of the enriched uranium stockpile with a purity of 60%. This represents a significant reduction from the previous estimate of 12 days by the Institute for Science and International Security. The report underscores that if the regime impedes and delays IAEA inspectors’ access to facilities, immediate detection of nuclear escape becomes a challenging task.
Despite nearly five years passing since the initial discovery of undeclared uranium traces, the IAEA’s NPT safeguards report asserts that such traces persist in all four nuclear facilities under inspection. Furthermore, the regime’s cooperation with the agency has been minimal over the past two and a half months, signaling a reluctance to collaborate in the future. In a move to reduce the transparency of its nuclear program, the regime banned some of the IAEA’s European inspectors with expertise in enrichment from visiting its sites.
According to the agency’s report, Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium increased by 691.2 kg, rising from 3,795.5 kg to 4,486.8 kg by October 28, 2023. The stockpile of enriched uranium with 60% purity reached 128.3 kg. Although the average uranium production has decreased by 60% to 2.9 kg per month, the regime managed to double the production of uranium with nearly 60% purity from December 2022 to June 2023. Even if production stops in the second half of the year, the regime could still achieve its annual production target.
The Iranian regime continues to produce uranium hexafluoride of 60% uranium with a purity of 5% in centrifuge cascades. The Fordow nuclear facility possesses an IR-6 centrifuge cascade, which was observed to have traces of undeclared activity in January 2023. The cascade, connected to another IR-6 cascade, produced uranium hexafluoride with traces of uranium particles at nearly 84 percent purity.
The report raises concerns about the lack of monitoring equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities since June 2022. The regime rejected proposals for new surveillance cameras and has not provided data or footage related to surveillance tools and cameras. The absence of monitoring equipment has led the IAEA to question whether the regime might change the use of advanced centrifuges or have a hidden stockpile for future use.
As of February 2023, the installation of advanced centrifuges has been nearly uniform, with the regime having around 6300 advanced centrifuges in Natanz and Fordow, totaling 13,500 when including IR-1 centrifuges. The slowdown in installation raises questions about the regime’s commitment to the informal nuclear understanding with the United States.
The IAEA concludes that the removal of equipment installed for JCPOA-related monitoring has significantly hindered its ability to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. With the regime’s expansion of 60% uranium reserves, concerns about the installation of advanced centrifuges in undeclared facilities are mounting.
Due to the regime’s refusal to address IAEA safeguard violations, the organization’s ability to monitor the expanding nuclear program has been greatly diminished, leaving uncertainties about potential deviations in nuclear materials, equipment, and capacities of undisclosed facilities.
The overarching concern is the potential risk associated with the regime’s secretive actions. The lack of transparency and cooperation, coupled with the regime’s refusal to resolve IAEA safeguard violations, raises questions about the regime’s true intentions. This opacity extends to the installation of advanced centrifuges and the possibility of hidden stockpiles or manufacturing facilities.
The potential danger of the regime’s nuclear program looms ominously on the global stage. The IAEA’s findings paint a concerning picture of escalating capabilities, with the regime’s refusal to address safeguard violations and lack of transparency casting a shadow of uncertainty.
The risk extends beyond the immediate production of weapons-grade uranium to potential covert actions, hidden stockpiles, and undisclosed manufacturing facilities. The international community must recognize the urgency of addressing these issues collectively.
Failing to do so not only jeopardizes the stability of the region but poses a significant threat to global peace and security. It is imperative that the pressure on the regime must intensify to ensure the effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms and to steer the Iranian regime away from the perilous path of unchecked nuclear advancement. The potential danger cannot be ignored, and concerted international action is essential to mitigate the risks posed by the Iranian regime’s nuclear program.
