Washington targets 32 individuals and entities across eight countries involved in Tehran’s procurement of missile propellants, UAV parts, and dual-use materials
November 12, 2025 – Washington, D.C. — The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sweeping new sanctions against 32 individuals and entities operating in Iran, the UAE, Türkiye, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine, accused of supporting Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs.
Treasury officials said the networks were part of an extensive transnational operation to procure and transport missile propellants, UAV engines, and dual-use components to Iran in defiance of international sanctions.
“Across the globe, Iran exploits financial systems to launder funds, procure components for its nuclear and conventional weapons programs, and support its terrorist proxies,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley. “At President Trump’s direction, we are applying maximum pressure to end Iran’s nuclear threat and expect the world to enforce UN snapback sanctions.”
Targeting Iran’s Missile Propellant Procurement
A central focus of the new sanctions is a multinational network known as the MVM Partnership, active since 2023, that supplied hundreds of metric tons of missile propellant ingredients—including sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, and sebacic acid—to Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), a subsidiary of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO).
OFAC identified UAE-based Marco Klinge, Iran- and Türkiye-based Majid Dolatkhah, and Vahid Qayumi as the main coordinators of the operation, procuring chemicals from China and routing them through front companies in the UAE, India, and Germany.
Both PCI and DIO are already sanctioned under Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Expanding Pressure on Iran’s Drone Supply Chain
OFAC also targeted several entities linked to Kimia Part Sivan Company (KIPAS), a key player in Iran’s IRGC-Quds Force UAV program.
Two KIPAS front companies—Iranian Baspar Puya Company (PARPO) and Pars Navandishan Artificial Intelligence Projects Company (ARIAPA)—were sanctioned for producing and repairing drone components, including electronics for UAV guidance systems.
KIPAS personnel Seyyed Ali Abtahi, Seyyed Mohammad Ruhani, Hosein Sayyadi Turanlu, and Ehsan Mohaghegh Dolatabadi were also blacklisted for overseeing UAV manufacturing and logistics in cooperation with the IRGC-QF, which is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S.
Sanctions on Mado’s Global Procurement Network
The action further expands to entities supporting Oje Parvas Mado Nafar Company (Mado), producer of Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 UAV engines.
China-based Ma Jie, identified as a central facilitator for Mado’s operations, coordinated meetings between Iranian defense officials and Chinese suppliers and managed several front companies, including Yiwu City Xianma Import and Export Co., Qian Xi Long Trading Co., and Hin Yun Trading Co.
These Hong Kong- and China-based firms funneled millions of dollars through Turkish intermediaries—Arkedya, Intro Oto, Own Ucar, Royal Yapi, Loris, Ozkam, and Artas—to procure metal alloys, spark plug caps, and UAV parts for Iran.
Disrupting Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Supply Lines
OFAC also designated Ukraine-based companies GK Imperativ Ukraina LLC and Ekofera LLC, which acted as fronts for Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA), the producer of Ababil-series UAVs and military aircraft.
Iranian nationals Bahram Tabibi, Batoul Shafiei, and Saeed Pahlavani Nejad were sanctioned for coordinating purchases of aerospace materials, engines, and sensors for HESA.
OFAC simultaneously updated HESA’s listing to include its new alias, FTP Co., after the company attempted to mask procurement activities.
Blocking Efforts to Evade Oversight
The Treasury also updated sanctions against the bulk carrier vessel HONESTAR (formerly SHUN KAI XING), which was previously identified for transporting sensitive machinery to Iran’s defense industry. The ship is currently stateless and using false flags, OFAC said, in an attempt to disguise shipments of computer-controlled manufacturing equipment used for missile guidance systems.
Impact and Legal Consequences
All property and assets of designated individuals and entities under U.S. jurisdiction are now frozen, and U.S. persons are prohibited from conducting transactions with them.
Treasury warned that foreign financial institutions facilitating significant transactions for sanctioned parties could face secondary sanctions, including restrictions on their U.S. banking access.
Violations of these sanctions could result in civil or criminal penalties under U.S. law.
Context: Renewed Global Pressure on Tehran
This marks the second round of U.S. nonproliferation sanctions since the September 27, 2025 reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran, following Tehran’s continued defiance of international nuclear and missile restrictions.
The designations fall under E.O. 13382 and E.O. 13224, targeting WMD proliferators and terrorism supporters, respectively.
Officials said the measures support the broader U.S. policy outlined in National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, aimed at denying Iran access to funds, technology, and networks sustaining its military expansion and regional aggression.
