These days, Iran’s government officials and state media analysts are speculating about how the regime’s 2021 presidential campaign is being represented. The common denominator of these analyses and speculations is that the more they speak about it, the dizzier they become.
And it is becoming clearer to them that they have no political reserves from the past, to put it as their current political capital in this election.
The obvious aspect of the analysis in the regime’s hardliner faction is that they know that the people are rejecting completely this regime and are begging that those who are even believing in this regime just for a little did not participate in this election so that they can take out their desired candidate from the election box, who is fully loyal to the supreme leader Ali Khamenei.
This speculation has become so entrenched among the regime, that the regime’s so-called reformist faction sees it as an inevitable ploy by their rivals.
In a note titled ‘They have counted on the people’s non-occurrence’, the state-run daily Hamdeli quoted Mousavi Lari, a member of the Central Council of the Assembly of Combatant Clerics, as having an interview with the Jamaran website. The trick that shows the best address of the system deadlock in choosing for the regime’s political contraction: “The fundamentalists are looking at the model of the spent March 2019 election.”
This fact has been recognized as a political line in the eyes of the government. The state-run daily Arman, in its March 3, issue, quoted Sadegh Zibakalam’s note, highlighting another aspect of the regime’s stalemate in the upcoming election: “It must be acknowledged that the 2021 elections actually belong to the fundamentalists. Reformists are unlikely to play a significant role in the 2021 elections.”
Similar speculations by both factions of the regime can be found in the state media, all of which admit to the nightmare of a popular boycott of the election. Hence, even the reformist faction of the regime, knowing that it will not benefit from this election, nevertheless seeks to boost the electoral market with all its might, to save the ship on which all of them are travelling:
“The 2021 elections are a big test for the government and the participants. We must make people to be present now. The whole management must work to eliminate this frustration of the people,” Hamdali daily quoted Mousavi Lari as saying on March 3.
Perspectives on Domestic and International Consequences of Iran’s 2021 Presidential Election
In the end, it is clear to them that there is no solution, just another political desert for the government. An ineffective election certainty is that ‘nothing will happen’ and a zero will be added to the thousand zeros in the record of this regime:
“It is not a matter of the country that one or more people are the final candidates for the reformist consensus; rather, the main issue is that nothing special will happen.” (Arman daily, Sadegh Zibakalam’s note, March 3)
Thus, by putting together these selected examples from the state media, the image is nothing but a fuss, and this time the regime will gain nothing.
The bottom line of all the speculation of the state media can be the kneeling of the reformist faction in front of Khamenei, who are begging him to be at least a useless background performer in the election show, and in the other faction it is just a fight for the positions in the legislature and the judiciary. This is a picture of the coordinates of the regime in the mirror of the 2021 election show:
“The behavior of the reformists in participating in the elections shows that they want to gain the trust of the rulers. The reformists are trying to give positive impulses to the leadership in order to attract the opinion of the leader to participate in the elections.” (Arman daily, Sadegh Zibakalam’s note, March 3)
And here is another vision of face of the regime, about its hardliner faction who are fighting for positions in the legislature and the judiciary:
“Now the fundamentalist movement feels that the risk of betting on Ghalibaf (Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the regime’s present parliament speaker) is high and they should go to someone who has a lower risk and Mr. Raisi (Ebrahim Raisi, regime’s chief of Justice, famous for his role in the mass political executions in 1988) can be that person.’ (Hamdali newspaper, quote by Mousavi Lari, March 3)
Governments officials and state media, who feel a high risk to bet on their speaker of parliament and see no chance than to accept the presidency of a person who is one of the main perpetrators of Iran’s 1988 political prisoner massacre, pre-empt the public hatred of their system and then address the incurable contraction of the regime in this election.