Despite promises of reform, the Iranian regime continues internet censorship, turning VPN sales into a multi-billion-toman business for regime insiders.
A Year After Empty Promises
One year after Iranian regime president Masoud Pezeshkian pledged to remove filtering on social networks and reduce internet censorship, nothing has changed. Popular platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, X (Twitter), Facebook, Telegram, TikTok, Netflix, Viber, Clubhouse, Snapchat, Signal, Google Play, Discord, Reddit, and even the Waze navigation app remain blocked in Iran.
Despite this widespread filtering, millions of Iranians continue to bypass censorship using VPNs. International statistics indicate that between 50 and 60 million people in Iran access Instagram and Telegram daily through VPN services.
The regime’s failure to deliver on its promises has once again exposed the lies behind its rhetoric, while the true motivations for maintaining filtering have come into sharper focus.
Censorship as a Tool of Repression
The primary purpose of these restrictions is to suppress dissent and prevent protests. Whenever uprisings break out, internet speed is deliberately reduced, disruptions increase, or nationwide shutdowns are enforced.
By controlling access to global platforms, the regime seeks to cut off citizens from real news, silence citizen journalists, and prevent the circulation of critical voices. Yet, despite these efforts, the Iranian people persist in defying censorship through VPNs.
The Business of Filtering: Profits for Insiders
Beyond repression, filtering has evolved into a lucrative business. Experts and officials have admitted that powerful regime insiders profit enormously from VPN sales. Ministers, parliament members, and other officials have acknowledged that the vast revenues generated by this parallel market flow directly into the pockets of institutions tied to the state and military-security apparatus.
Reports from the regime’s own Parliament Research Center and the Tehran E-Commerce Association reveal that more than 80 percent of Iranian internet users rely on VPNs, with nearly a third opting for paid services. The average monthly cost of VPNs ranges from 250,000 to 500,000 tomans, creating an annual turnover worth several trillion tomans.
Abolhassan Firouzabadi, former secretary of the Supreme Cyberspace Council, admitted last year that even large companies are involved in the VPN trade, describing the market as having a “significant volume.” Unlike China, which has invested in domestic platforms, Iran’s filtering system has instead spawned a gray market enriching insiders.
Who Benefits and Who Suffers
Digital businesses are among the hardest hit. The Tehran E-Commerce Association has warned that widespread reliance on insecure VPNs exposes users to phishing, data theft, and potential exploitation for cyberattacks. The proliferation of free, infected VPNs has also fueled a rise in cyberattacks originating from Iran.
Meanwhile, political and corruption dimensions of this trade are becoming clearer. Members of parliament, including Javad Nikbin, have openly acknowledged that “the same people who implement filtering are also the main sellers of VPNs.” The newspaper Etemad reported that even the children of regime elites—known as Aghazadehs—are deeply involved. One case pointed to the son of Ensiyeh Khazali, former deputy for women’s affairs under Ebrahim Raisi, as a direct beneficiary.
Thus, filtering has become a dual tool: on one side, it enforces repression; on the other, it generates billions in revenue for regime cronies.
Filtering as a Profitable Sanction
Just as international sanctions have been exploited by regime officials and military institutions for illicit profits, filtering has become another avenue for black-market profiteering. Any serious attempt to lift filtering would threaten this revenue stream, making it unlikely that the regime will end the practice voluntarily.
For the Iranian people, the consequences are severe. Citizens are estimated to spend over 100 trillion tomans annually on VPNs—money that could instead support legitimate digital businesses and innovation.
Nima Ghazi, head of the Tehran E-Commerce Association, has warned that continued filtering will not only block Iran’s digital economy from competing globally but will also drive technology professionals abroad, create widespread frustration among the workforce, and ultimately collapse the country’s innovation ecosystem.
Iran’s internet filtering has become more than just a repressive measure; it is now a source of immense profit for the regime’s insiders and their families. While officials enrich themselves, ordinary citizens bear the financial burden, businesses suffer, and Iran’s digital future is being sacrificed.
The persistence of filtering demonstrates how deeply corruption and repression are intertwined within the regime—making promises of reform nothing more than hollow rhetoric.
