The revived draft law centralizes all regulatory and punitive powers over digital media in the hands of IRIB, paving the way for sweeping restrictions and political control.
A new draft law aimed at tightening state control over online media has returned to Iran regime’s parliament, signaling a renewed push by hardline factions to restrict digital freedoms. The proposed legislation, titled Support and Handling of Violations in the Domain of Audio and Visual Content in Cyberspace, reintroduces the core tenets of the abandoned “cyber protection” initiative under a new name and with broader powers for the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).
The political driving force behind the bill is the coalition of the Stability Front and supporters of Saeed Jalili, who seek to impose comprehensive filtering and media monopolization. Their aim is to grant IRIB absolute authority over all audio-visual activity online, from licensing to enforcement and punishment. This transfer of power removes the role of independent oversight bodies and eliminates judicial review, creating a structure that enables wide-ranging media repression and suppression of independent voices.
The list of signatories underscores the political alignment behind the bill. Figures such as Hamid Rasaei, Mousa Ghazanfarabadi, Reza Taghipour, Mojtaba Zolnouri, Mehdi Kuchakzadeh, Mohammad-Taqi Naghdali, Hossein-Ali Haji-Deligani, Kamran Ghazanfari, Morteza Agha-Tehrani, Nasrollah Pejmanfar, Bijan Nobaveh, Ahmad Rastineh, Seyed-Ali Yazdikhah, Bankipour, and Thabati represent the regime’s most reactionary faction has repeatedly championed restrictive internet legislation. The bill once again originates from the parliament’s Cultural Commission, a body heavily aligned with the Stability Front.
Hamid Rasaei, head of the Committee for Culture, Art, and Media, previously claimed that the bill addresses a “legal vacuum” in regulating online audio-visual content. He stated that drafting began in February 2024 and included over 25 specialized meetings with IRIB, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and the Parliamentary Research Center. The bill again presents itself under the guise of “protecting user rights,” echoing the rhetoric of earlier cyber restrictions. Rasaei emphasized the introduction of detailed offense categories and extensive punitive measures, including the formation of specialized review boards.
According to Rasaei, media owners had demanded stronger enforcement guarantees, clearer red lines, and privileges such as tax incentives and permission for platforms to host live broadcasting. However, the bill fails to differentiate between traditional media and digital platforms, leaving broad interpretive room for selective and politically motivated enforcement. Critics believe this ambiguity is intentional, designed to expand state leverage over online information flows.
The bill formally empowers IRIB as the sole regulator for “user-generated” and “publisher-based” media, including streaming services and domestic series production. This shift sidelines the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and consolidates license issuance, content oversight, and punitive authority within IRIB. A controversial clause stipulates that when both regulators are involved, IRIB’s disciplinary decisions override those of other institutions. Even if the Ministry of Culture deems a punishment unnecessary, it is obligated to comply with IRIB’s ruling.
Under the new framework, IRIB gains sweeping powers to reward or punish media entities according to its own ideological criteria. Support—ranging from advertising discounts to infrastructure assistance—will be reserved for those deemed compliant with “the standards of the Islamic Revolution.” Other state bodies may extend support only with IRIB approval, entrenching political favoritism and limiting independent media’s ability to operate.
The punitive measures outlined in the bill are extensive and unprecedented. Restrictions include temporary bans on advertising, reduced bandwidth or internet speed, and heavy fines ranging from double to ten times the profit gained from the alleged violation. Additional penalties include fines amounting to one to five percent of annual gross revenue and even full revocation of operating licenses. Such measures directly threaten the financial survival of private media outlets and increase the regime’s ability to silence critical voices.
The bill also redefines violations in ways that criminalize broad categories of ordinary online activity. Publishing content without IRIB approval becomes a central offense, effectively granting the state broadcaster veto power over digital expression. Judicial oversight is notably absent: the five-member High Board for Handling Violations is dominated by IRIB-aligned institutions, with only one representative from the Prosecutor General’s Office. This imbalance undermines judicial independence and ensures that enforcement decisions reflect the political interests of the Stability Front.
The move to revive and rebrand the longstanding “protection” bill is widely viewed as an attempt to bypass public opposition. The ultimate objective is the creation of a tiered, politically controlled internet that restricts citizens’ access to information while centralizing regulatory authority in the hands of a single state institution. Hardline figures like Agha-Tehrani and Rasaei continue to pursue the same goals that shaped their previous efforts in the eleventh parliament: narrowing civic space, crippling independent media, and consolidating digital governance under IRIB.
The proposed law, presented as a measure to safeguard users, in fact constitutes a systematic mechanism for broad and unchecked censorship. It enables IRIB to control licensing, define offenses, issue punishments, and block avenues for appeal. The framework accelerates the erosion of independent oversight, entrenches ideological criteria in media governance, and sets the stage for selective enforcement designed to marginalize dissenting voices.
Legal expert and media analyst Kambiz Norouzi described the proposal as “Welcome to Protection Plan 3,” warning that its indirect language conceals a renewed strategy to tighten the regime’s grip on the digital sphere. He noted that under the bill, users on platforms such as Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, and large segments of Telegram would require licenses from IRIB to continue their activities. Platform operators would also have to obtain authorization from regime authorities. Domestic platforms such as Divar and Aparat would be required to verify users’ identities before allowing them to upload content.
Norouzi further highlighted that all primary and appeals boards reviewing violations would be appointed by the head of IRIB, removing any semblance of independence. He described the persistent efforts of parliamentarians to restrict online access, suppress free expression, and obstruct the free flow of information as part of a long-running political project: Protection Plan 1 failed, Protection Plan 2 failed, and now the third iteration has returned, more expansive than before.
The draft law represents one of the most significant escalations to date in the Islamic Republic’s policy of digital repression. If adopted, it will reshape Iran’s media landscape by granting a politically aligned broadcaster unchecked authority over the country’s digital space, curtailing public access to independent information, and institutionalizing censorship under the banner of user protection.
