June 3, 1989 (13th of Khordad in the Persian calendar) marks more than just the death of Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Iranian regime. It also signifies a pivotal and deeply revealing moment in the history of the regime—a moment when fear of collapse, fear of organized resistance, and a deep crisis of legitimacy gripped the ruling establishment.
To understand the significance of this date, one must examine the events surrounding Khomeini’s death, particularly through the lens of statements made by regime insiders and official media—sources that inadvertently expose truths often missing from the official narrative.
Fear at the Core of Power
One revealing source is a report from the state-affiliated website Jahan News, published on June 5, 2023. The report plainly acknowledged the anxiety felt by the regime at the time of Khomeini’s death, stating:
“The hypocrites [a derogatory term used by the regime for the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK)] believed they deserved to take power. They were more prepared than any foreign force for this moment. Their leader even stated in a military gathering on May 28, 1989, that the organization’s forces must be ready for the situation following Khomeini’s death.”
This admission points to the regime’s real concern—not a foreign military invasion, but a domestic opposition group with a military wing, the National Liberation Army of Iran, positioned to challenge the system from within.
That fear was not confined to the media. Prominent regime officials publicly echoed it. Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili, a leading cleric and then-head of the judiciary, openly admitted during a Friday prayer sermon in Tehran:
“Our friends were afraid; they trembled. And the enemies were very hopeful for such a day.”
A Hasty and Unlawful Transfer of Power
The magnitude of the crisis became fully visible after Khomeini’s death. Even before his funeral had concluded, the regime’s Assembly of Experts, the body tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader, convened an emergency session. Members were summoned by phone in a frantic and unprecedented rush. Within hours, Ali Khamenei—who at the time was neither a senior cleric nor recognized as a religious authority—was appointed Supreme Leader.
This selection was made in blatant disregard for the Islamic Republic’s own constitutional requirements, which stipulated that the Supreme Leader must be a recognized marja (source of emulation in Shi’a Islam). Khamenei did not meet this condition, a fact acknowledged even by key figures such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, a powerful regime insider. In his later memoirs and public statements, Rafsanjani admitted that many had initially supported a leadership council, but the urgency and fear of a power vacuum forced them to accept Khamenei as the sole leader.
The rush to install Khamenei was not born of consensus or religious conviction—it was a political maneuver driven by panic.
The Unspoken Catalyst: The National Liberation Army
The real catalyst for this panic was the perceived threat posed by the National Liberation Army of Iran, the military wing of the MEK. This force had already demonstrated its strength by contributing to Iran’s decision to accept a ceasefire with Iraq in 1988, effectively ending the eight-year Iran-Iraq War.
In the chaotic hours after Khomeini’s death, regime officials worked around the clock to prevent what they feared most: that the MEK and its supporters might seize the moment to overthrow the system of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), the ideological backbone of the regime.
As one regime insider bluntly put it:
“They hadn’t even buried Khomeini yet. While the funeral was still ongoing, the Assembly of Experts was in session 24 hours a day. They had to choose Khamenei quickly to stand against the resistance—to stand against the Mojahedin.”
A Crisis Buried with the Body
Khomeini’s death triggered not a transition, but a crisis-management operation. The new leadership was installed in a panic, bypassing constitutional and religious norms. This act did not project strength—it exposed the regime’s vulnerabilities.
While the official historiography of the Islamic Republic has largely erased or downplayed the role of the MEK and the National Liberation Army, internal documents and statements tell a different story. The regime’s greatest fear was not foreign invasion. It was the organized resistance force claiming to represent the Iranian people and promising to replace religious tyranny with democratic governance.
The Legacy of Khordad 13
Today, Khordad 13 is often marked in Iran with official ceremonies commemorating Khomeini’s death. But the date deserves deeper reflection. It marks the regime’s moment of existential vulnerability, the hasty elevation of a relatively unknown figure to Supreme Leader, and the beginning of a new era of repression aimed at preventing future uprisings.
The panic and improvisation that followed Khomeini’s death were not isolated incidents. They were symptoms of a regime that has, since its inception, ruled through fear and coercion—and continues to fear the power of organized opposition. Even though the National Liberation Army no longer threatens the regime militarily from outside its borders, its legacy lives on in the Resistance Units active inside Iran today. These groups, inspired by the MEK, continue to challenge the regime’s authority and legitimacy from within.
Thus, Khordad 13 is not just a date on the calendar. It is a stark reminder of how fragile the foundations of the Islamic Republic truly are—and how deeply the regime fears the very people it claims to represent.
