Cosmetic divisions resurface as Iran regime factions compete for control—not reform
The aftermath of the 12-day war has reignited visible tensions within the Iranian regime, with competing factions scrambling to reposition themselves as the country faces growing public discontent and international scrutiny. While state-aligned media and regime insiders frame the dispute as one between “pragmatic conservatives” and hardliners, the underlying power struggle is less about reform and more about control over the regime’s trajectory and survival.
On July 23, the reformist-branded newspaper Ham Mihan highlighted recent activities by two senior regime insiders, Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Velayati, portraying them as voices of moderation seeking to shift Iran’s policies post-war. Larijani’s unannounced trip to Moscow on July 20 to discuss nuclear issues with President Vladimir Putin and Velayati’s July 21 call for a “new approach” were cited as signs of a supposed return to pragmatism.
But such gestures do not reflect genuine shifts in policy or ideology. Larijani and Velayati, like all senior regime officials, have long served the system’s core interests and upheld its repressive structure. Velayati’s vague appeal for “national cohesion” and warnings against “outdated methods” are more likely tactical adjustments aimed at diffusing domestic anger than any real break from the regime’s authoritarian norms. Even his July 14 suggestion that Iran is open to talks “without preconditions” serves the regime’s broader strategy of buying time and easing pressure—without changing course.
The so-called debate over diplomacy is largely a manufactured contrast. On the other side of the regime’s controlled spectrum, hardline figures such as Saeed Jalili and the Stability Front (Paydari) have postured against the recent ceasefire and condemned any engagement with Western powers. Jalili has publicly criticized President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi for their role in negotiating the ceasefire and entertaining nuclear talks.
Yet all these figures—whether labeled moderate, reformist, or hardliner—operate within and uphold the same unelected system, which continues to rely on repression, censorship, and violence to maintain its grip on power. Differences in tone or tactics serve more to manage internal rivalries and public perception than to chart any new political direction.
Even longstanding figures like Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, once touted as a hardliner, have shifted positions depending on the regime’s needs. His alignment with Pezeshkian during the 2024 election season reflected not ideological evolution, but factional maneuvering in a tightly controlled political environment.
As internal competition heats up, the regime faces no real ideological reckoning—only strategic infighting over how best to preserve itself amid mounting crises. While the faces and rhetoric may change, the system remains the same.
The Iranian people, increasingly disillusioned by decades of staged political theater, are not likely to be swayed by recycled slogans or artificial divides. The real conflict in Iran is not between so-called moderates and hardliners—it is between a repressive regime and a society demanding freedom, dignity, and change.
