Washington, DC — May 8, 2025 — At a high-stakes press conference held at the Washington office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), senior officials unveiled new intelligence detailing the Iranian regime’s accelerated efforts to develop nuclear weapons, including a clandestine facility designed to produce boosted nuclear warheads and hydrogen bombs.

The conference, titled “Press Conference to Reveal New Nuclear Weapons Facility in Iran,” featured disclosures from Soona Samsami, the U.S. Representative of the NCRI, and Alireza Jafarzadeh, Deputy Director of the NCRI’s Washington Office. Both speakers underscored the urgent threat posed by the Iranian regime’s continued pursuit of nuclear arms under the guise of civilian activity.

Hydrogen Bomb Development Under SPND Supervision

According to Samsami and Jafarzadeh, the regime’s nuclear weapons program is now focused on boosted nuclear warheads capable of being mounted on ballistic missiles with a range of over 3,000 kilometers. Central to this effort is the Organization for Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), an entity controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and ultimately overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

SPND has been quietly transferring nuclear fusion and tritium experts from Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and other scientific bodies to its operations. Tritium, a rare isotope used in advanced nuclear weapons, is being actively extracted and utilized — a key step toward the creation of a hydrogen bomb.

“This project is not part of the original AMAD Plan, which was shelved in 2003,” said Jafarzadeh. “What we’re seeing is a new, more dangerous phase aimed at boosting Iran’s nuclear capability.”

The ‘Rainbow Site’ in Eyvanaki

At the heart of this new program is a facility near the town of Eyvanaki, Semnan Province — codenamed the “Rainbow Site” or Rangin Kaman by Iranian officials. Originally constructed in 2009 under the supervision of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the slain architect of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the facility spans roughly 2,500 acres and includes underground complexes.

SPND operates the site through a front company named Diba Energy Sina, which is officially registered as a producer of chemical solvents. According to NCRI, this company is part of a wider network under the Petsar Group (Pishtazan-e Tose’e San’ati Aria Razi), a conglomerate of seemingly benign firms operating as covers for illicit nuclear and missile development.

Petsar’s leadership includes IRGC Brigadier General Nasser Maleki, a former head of the Hemmat Missile Industries and a UN-sanctioned figure for his role in ballistic missile development. Other board members are linked to the Ministry of Defense and other state-run industrial and research entities.

Concealment and Security

The NCRI revealed that the Eyvanaki site is protected with high levels of secrecy and military-grade security. The area is fenced, monitored by surveillance cameras, and off-limits to civilians under the pretext of a “no-hunting zone.” Locals have been misled into believing the facility is either a paint factory or a general missile-related installation, with no mention of nuclear activities.

Near the site lies the Qadir Long-Range Radar Station, operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force, further underscoring the military character of the operation. The radar system was reportedly installed around the same time the Eyvanaki facility was completed in 2013.

Nuclear Experts and Suppressed Research

Among the key personnel named in the disclosures are:

  • Dr. Ebrahim Haji Ebrahimi – Former employee of the Atomic Energy Organization, nuclear science PhD holder, now working with SPND on tritium-related projects.

  • Hadi Zaker Khatir – Former assistant professor at Malek Ashtar University, also involved in fusion-related research for SPND.

According to the NCRI, Iranian authorities have actively suppressed any academic or scientific publications on tritium and nuclear fusion to avoid raising international suspicions.

A Pattern of Deception

Jafarzadeh emphasized that the Iranian regime has consistently used civilian front companies to mask its military nuclear work, just as it did in past revelations involving Natanz, Arak, and Fordow. The NCRI’s Defense and Strategic Research Committee compiled the intelligence from sources inside Iran, particularly the network operated by the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), which has a long history of accurately exposing secret nuclear facilities.

Samsami warned that Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain integral to the regime’s survival strategy. “The regime has spent over two trillion dollars on its nuclear program while neglecting its oil and gas industries,” she stated. “Since [Masoud] Pezeshkian assumed the presidency, over 1,200 prisoners have been executed. This is a regime trying to buy time while racing for the bomb.”

Call for Action: Snapback Mechanism and Resistance

The NCRI called for the immediate reactivation of the UN snapback mechanism and a complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Both speakers emphasized that the IAEA must not merely inspect, but oversee the closure of all nuclear-related sites in Iran.

“The solution is not military intervention,” said Samsami. “It is recognizing the Iranian people’s right to resist and supporting the organized resistance movement. There’s no need for boots on the ground or financial support — only international political will.”

Conclusion

This latest revelation adds to decades of intelligence disclosures by the NCRI and PMOI. As the regime doubles down on its covert nuclear ambitions amid growing domestic unrest and international scrutiny, the NCRI reiterated its core message: Iran’s nuclear threat is inseparable from its authoritarian rule — and confronting it requires both strategic transparency and international solidarity with the Iranian people.

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