With air and land channels increasingly restricted, the Iranian regime turns to covert sea routes and proxy networks to sustain Hezbollah’s military and financial capacity.
A new investigation by The Maritime Executive shows that as Lebanon’s new government tightens control over air transport, the Iranian regime is pushing deeper into maritime smuggling to sustain Hezbollah’s military infrastructure.
Under heavy U.S. pressure to disarm Hezbollah—and amid Israeli warnings of direct intervention—Beirut has increased restrictions on passenger and cargo flights.
As a result, Tehran now faces significant obstacles in sending cash and weapons through Beirut airport, forcing it to revive and expand covert seaborne channels.
Despite sustained Israeli airstrikes, Hezbollah’s stockpiles are not fully depleted, and the group is racing to replace destroyed arsenals to preserve its influence in Lebanese politics.
The regime and the IRGC’s Quds Force share this objective, viewing Hezbollah as an indispensable proxy whose weakened position must be restored at all costs.
Before the recent escalation, IRGC Unit 190—responsible for covert weapons logistics—coordinated with Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 and relied on three primary routes.
First were the frequent Mahan Air cargo flights between Tehran and Beirut, unloaded with no interference from Lebanese authorities. A second channel funneled supplies through Syria via land routes, Latakia port, or Damascus airport. The third route moved shipments directly to the port of Beirut.
According to The Maritime Executive, Unit 190 now considers maritime smuggling the most viable option for moving weapons, cash, and technical materials.
The regime is unlikely to use its official shipping lines, instead relying on covert pathways designed to leave minimal trace.
One method involves hiding illicit cargo inside containers aboard legitimate commercial vessels with multiple stopovers. Another uses small local ships for offshore transfers or loading via Turkey—a hub that continues to offer permissive conditions for “Axis of Resistance” logistics, especially as Syria becomes increasingly insecure and closely monitored.
The report notes that Unit 190 and Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 are actively searching for vulnerabilities within Lebanon’s coastal security to reestablish lost supply capacity.
Drawing on experience gained from smuggling to the Houthis in Yemen, both units favor small-scale operations using light vessels, underused ports, and dual-use materials that can be converted into munitions once inside Lebanon.
Iran’s financial support for Hezbollah dates back to the 1980s, transforming the group into a dominant armed force in Lebanon.
Despite Hezbollah’s grip on Lebanese politics and the economy, it remains heavily dependent on Iranian regime funding—mostly delivered in cash before being funneled into Lebanese banking networks.
In recent days, Israeli sources reported that both weapons transfers and financial support from Tehran to Hezbollah have continued despite increased surveillance and targeted killings of key operatives in Beirut.
With air and land routes increasingly restricted, the regime has shifted to third-country intermediaries, maritime corridors, and exchange-house networks to deliver arms and hundreds of millions of dollars.
According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Iranian regime has transferred roughly one billion dollars to Hezbollah since the beginning of the year, using exchange houses, cash-based businesses, and ostensibly legitimate financial channels to obscure the origin and destination of the funds.
This renewed maritime emphasis underscores how Tehran, even under intense pressure, continues to prioritize the survival and rearmament of its most important regional proxy.
