For decades, the Iranian regime has treated Syria as a linchpin of its regional influence, famously dubbing it the “35th province” of Iran. However, this once-critical strategic asset has become a glaring symbol of failure for Tehran’s expansionist ambitions.
The Strategic Value of Syria
To understand the significance of Syria in Iran’s foreign policy, one must revisit a revealing statement by Mehdi Taeb, head of the Ammar Strategic Base, a regime-affiliated political and cultural organization. In 2013, Taeb declared:
“If the enemy attacks us and wants to take Syria or Khuzestan, the priority is that we keep Syria. Because if we keep Syria, we can also take back Khuzestan. But if we lose Syria, we cannot even keep Tehran.”
This statement, published by the state-controlled Asr-e Iran website, highlights the centrality of Syria in Tehran’s regional strategy.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his allies have long touted the concepts of the “Shia Crescent” and “Strategic Depth” as cornerstones of their foreign policy. However, these ambitions face unprecedented challenges due to mounting international and domestic pressures on Bashar al-Assad’s government, threatening the foundation of Tehran’s influence in the region.
A Costly Gamble
Iran’s involvement in Syria has been marked by massive financial and military investments. From the outset of the Syrian civil war, the Iranian regime funneled substantial resources to prop up Assad. Estimates suggest that Khamenei allocated at least $50 billion of Iran’s national wealth to support Assad through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its elite Quds Force, led by the killed Qassem Soleimani.
Heshmatollah Falahatpishe, a former member of the Iranian parliament, inadvertently confirmed part of this expenditure when he stated:
“We gave Syria $20 to $30 billion, and we have to get it back. This was the nation’s money.”
These immense outlays occurred while millions of Iranians endured severe economic hardship. Public frustration boiled over during nationwide protests, where chants like “Leave Syria; think about us” reflected the people’s anger at the regime’s misplaced priorities.
Thwarting Peace and Escalating Conflict
Efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis have been consistently undermined by Tehran. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 2254, adopted in 2015, called for a political transition and an end to violence in Syria. However, Iran’s military and political interference, under the guise of defending Shiite shrines, derailed these efforts. The IRGC’s Quds Force mobilized militias to suppress opposition to Assad, effectively prolonging the conflict and stalling peace initiatives.
The Fall of a Strategic Pillar
The erosion of Iranian influence in Syria is a significant blow to Khamenei’s vision of regional dominance. For years, the regime considered Syria a “pillar of the resistance pavilion,” sparing no expense to maintain its foothold. But this pillar is crumbling, taking with it the regime’s dreams of a dominant regional network.
Khamenei’s fear of losing Syria is deeply rooted in the regime’s survival strategy. As Taeb ominously suggested, losing Syria could destabilize Tehran itself:
“If they didn’t fight in Syria, this enemy would come inside Iran. We would have to fight them in Kermanshah, Hamadan, and other provinces.”
Implications for Tehran
The collapse of Assad’s regime would not only signify the failure of Iran’s regional policies but could also trigger a domino effect threatening the regime’s grip on power. With its “strategic depth” eroding, the regime’s influence network is increasingly fragile. Public discontent, coupled with the regime’s inability to sustain its costly foreign adventures, exposes its vulnerabilities.
The downfall of Assad could mark the beginning of the end for Khamenei’s expansionist ambitions and signal a broader decline in Tehran’s regional power. As Mehdi Taeb’s stark warning implies, without Syria, even Tehran’s stability could be at risk.
