The 12-day internet blackout during the Iran-Israel war exposes a deepening system of unequal access, government surveillance, and state-controlled information flows.
The complete shutdown of the international internet in Iran during the recent 12-day Iran-Israel war has once again thrust the regime’s “class-based internet” policies into the national and international spotlight.
While access to the global internet was abruptly cut off for most citizens, evidence suggests that select individuals and institutions remained fully connected—a revelation that has sparked widespread backlash and renewed fears over the regime’s growing control of cyberspace.
In the midst of the blackout, many internet-based businesses and IT leaders called for alternatives to blanket restrictions. They proposed a more “targeted” approach to managing access—essentially advocating for segmented, tiered internet availability based on profession or purpose.
But while these suggestions were framed as practical solutions, social media users and digital rights activists quickly condemned them as disguised support for an already unfolding two-tier internet system.
The Silent Rollout of a Segregated Internet
Experts and analysts now believe that class-based internet access has already been quietly implemented in various sectors, including media, universities, security institutions, and pro-regime cyber units. Despite official denials, there is mounting evidence that certain users—primarily government officials, security operatives, and affiliated organizations—have maintained uninterrupted access to international platforms such as Telegram and X during blackouts.
Technical data from NetBlocks and OONI confirms these suspicions. While the general population was offline, senior officials and regime-linked media continued publishing updates and content online. This differential access exposes the existence of a secret whitelist, granting preferred users exclusive connectivity while silencing the broader population.
Official Denials and Contradictions
In response to growing public outrage, Ehsan Chitsaz, Deputy Minister of Communications in Iran’s 14th government, reiterated the regime’s supposed opposition to class-based access:
“A high-quality, fair, and universal internet is the right of all people and the backbone of the digital economy. Any development policy must be based on justice in connectivity, not on limited concessions.”
This statement came after an official letter from the Tehran Province Computer Guild Organization, which advocated for unrestricted internet access for IT professionals. However, following public criticism, several board members of the organization distanced themselves from the letter, stating it did not reflect the views of all members and reaffirming their rejection of discriminatory access.
But despite such denials, the reality on the ground tells a different story. A host of government policies and initiatives have steadily moved Iran toward a stratified internet infrastructure.
Case Studies in Discrimination
In 2023, the introduction of “tourist SIM cards” marked a turning point in the regime’s dual access policies. While framed as an attempt to boost tourism, these SIM cards provided unfiltered international internet access to foreign visitors—a luxury denied to ordinary Iranian citizens. The policy drew criticism for institutionalizing discrimination based on nationality and wealth.
Then-Deputy Minister of Tourism Ali Asghar Shalbafian announced that, with approval from the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content, international-access SIM cards would be distributed to foreign tourists, tour operators, and hotel staff—effectively expanding class-based access to include actors in the domestic tourism industry.
At the same time, regime figures like former ICT Minister Issa Zarepour echoed claims of opposition to discriminatory access, while also admitting that certain regulations grant broader access to specific groups—a statement that confirms the existence of tiered internet privileges.
Further reports reveal that select university professors and students have been granted unrestricted internet, though the criteria for these selections remain opaque, raising concerns that political loyalty or security vetting, rather than academic merit, determine eligibility.
The regime’s so-called “cyber defenders”, often affiliated with the Basij and IRGC, were highly active online during the shutdown—an indication that these groups operate on a whitelist, bypassing national filters and restrictions.
The “Cyber Free Zones” Agenda
Another controversial initiative is the establishment of “cyber free zones”, modeled after Iran’s economic free trade zones. These areas are being designed to offer full internet access for approved digital businesses, raising further questions about fairness and transparency.
Ehsan Chitsaz recently confirmed that this project is under review by the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission, and that details of access levels will be announced after approval. Such statements directly contradict public claims that the regime opposes class-based internet.
Economic and Geographic Disparities
Beyond institutional segregation, economic power has become another axis of digital discrimination. During the blackout, many Iranians reported seeing wealthier citizens using expensive VPNs or even Starlink terminals to stay connected. Given the high cost and legal risks associated with Starlink, access was likely limited to elite groups or those with regime connections.
Moreover, VPN performance and internet access levels varied drastically by location and service provider. In some affluent Tehran neighborhoods, users found it easier to connect than in lower-income areas—a disparity that points to a non-market-based system of bandwidth management, quietly implementing a tiered access model across Iran.
After the ceasefire, connectivity was restored in phases: first through ADSL and fiber-optic internet, then mobile data. Users of Hamrah-e Avval (MCI) reported that even after the official return of internet access, they were still restricted to Iran’s national intranet, further demonstrating unequal treatment among service providers.
A Pattern of Repression, Not Reform
The Iranian public remembers the blackouts of November 2019 and 2022, but the recent shutdown reveals something deeper: a more sophisticated and permanent infrastructure of control. Despite the 14th government’s campaign slogans promising internet freedom, it has continued and expanded the restrictive policies of its predecessors.
In practice, filtering, user selection, and targeted access privileges have evolved from temporary tactics to core features of the regime’s cyber governance strategy. Governments may change, but the policy of digital exclusion and surveillance endures.
Conclusion:
Iran’s internet is no longer just filtered—it is being systematically divided along political, institutional, geographic, and economic lines. The regime’s class-based internet model, once speculative, is now a structural reality. As access to information becomes a privilege reserved for the few, digital inequality deepens, reinforcing broader patterns of repression and marginalization in Iranian society.
