New details surrounding Iran’s “trusty” oil intermediaries point to a sprawling network of security-linked officials, politically connected businessmen, and billions of dollars in unreturned oil revenues.
Every day, new details are emerging about Iran’s so-called “trusty” scandal—a sprawling case involving hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenues and foreign currency allegedly not returned to the country’s economic cycle.
The allegations point to a network that allegedly includes former security officials, relatives of senior regime figures, and businessmen and intermediaries who have operated for years within Iran’s foreign trade and oil-export structures.
The central question is straightforward: How were individuals with such political, security, and commercial connections entrusted with oil transactions worth billions of dollars in the first place?
And perhaps more importantly, why did some of them allegedly remain active in oil transactions even after accumulating enormous debts?
The shadowy figure at the center
At the heart of the allegations is a figure known as “Shayan,” whose real identity has not been publicly established.
According to reports cited in connection with the case, Shayan was a former director-general responsible for fuel and energy at Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. The position would have placed him close to one of the country’s most strategically sensitive economic sectors.
Reports nevertheless allege that a network associated with Shayan went beyond oversight and played a role in selecting and organizing some of the oil “trusties”—intermediaries entrusted with selling Iranian oil and returning the proceeds.
The reported scale of the network is staggering. One account alleges that nine individuals associated with the network failed to return roughly 2,000 trillion tomans in oil revenues to the government treasury.
Among the names mentioned are relatives of powerful regime figures, including a son of former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei, a son of former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian, and the son-in-law of a former intelligence minister under Hassan Rouhani.
These allegations require independent verification, but if substantiated, they would reveal a system in which political and security connections played a decisive role in access to some of Iran’s most valuable economic resources.
From the security apparatus to oil sales
One of the figures repeatedly mentioned alongside Shayan is Meysam Darzinjad, a former head of the Ministry of Intelligence’s pension fund.
Sources cited in reports about the case allege that the fund was used as an economic vehicle for organizing oil intermediaries and lobbying for allocations to sell Iranian crude.
The presence of individuals with backgrounds inside security institutions raises a fundamental question: Were these intermediaries selected because of their commercial qualifications—or because of their connections within the power structure?
The answer matters because Iran’s oil revenues are ultimately public resources. When billions of dollars disappear from the state’s accounts or remain outside the formal economic system, ordinary Iranians bear the consequences through inflation, currency depreciation, and declining public resources.
The commercial network surrounding Momenin
Among the businessmen named in the allegations is Mohammadhadi Momenin, who has been linked in reports to approximately $2 billion in unreturned oil revenues.
His significance, however, extends beyond the allegations surrounding oil transactions. Reports describe an established commercial infrastructure involving currency exchange, domestic and foreign companies, and international trade that existed before his reported involvement in oil sales.
Corporate records in Britain have also been cited in connection with companies bearing his name. These include Group Investment Momenin Ltd and Cellpack Ltd.
British Companies House records reportedly show an individual named Mohammadhadi Momenin serving as a director of Cellpack, with that directorship ending on February 12, 2016. Separately, documents cited in reports connect Group Investment Momenin with the Spanish restaurant chain Telepizza, which announced in December 2016 that it intended to enter the Iranian market through an exclusive master-franchise agreement with the company.
These records establish commercial connections, but they do not by themselves prove involvement in the alleged oil-revenue diversion. That distinction is essential.
Another alleged intermediary
Another prominent name in the case is Ruhollah Razavi.
Public corporate information about Razavi is more limited, while reports have portrayed him as having close connections to the network attributed to Shayan.
Some media reports have described Razavi as the son-in-law of Majid Motaghi-Far, a member of the central council and spokesman of the Stability Front. Other reports have linked Razavi and Momenin to financial support for electoral activities associated with the faction. The accuracy and scope of these allegations require independent verification.
More serious allegations concern Razavi’s purported operational role in oil transactions. Sources claim that he became a trusted associate of Shayan and that his office in Tehran was used for meetings and negotiations related to oil deals. More than $1 billion in allegedly unreturned oil revenues has reportedly been associated with him.
There are also claims that Razavi provided information about competing oil intermediaries to the network, potentially helping eliminate rivals from the market. These allegations likewise require documentary verification.
A wider network of politically connected figures
The reported network extends beyond Shayan, Momenin, Razavi, and other central figures.
Names mentioned in various reports include Ehsan Sakhaei, described as the son-in-law of former Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi; Ehsan Taheri, a currency-exchange businessman allegedly linked to around $700 million in unreturned oil revenues; and Ali Rezaei, the son of Mohsen Rezaei, who has been reported as having lived for an extended period in Dubai and worked as an oil trader.
Another figure mentioned is Ali Bayandourian, described in reports as an experienced seller of oil and petrochemical products who allegedly operated through a network of companies registered in Iran and Southeast Asia.
The recurring appearance of children and relatives of senior officials is perhaps the most politically significant feature of the allegations.
If confirmed, it would raise questions about whether access to Iran’s oil trade was effectively governed not merely by commercial expertise but by proximity to centers of political and security power.
Who protects the intermediaries?
The central issue is therefore larger than the financial losses attributed to individual businessmen.
Who selected these intermediaries?
Which institutions approved them?
Who authorized the transfer of oil worth billions of dollars?
Who monitored the proceeds?
And when enormous debts allegedly accumulated, why were some of these individuals reportedly able to remain active in the oil trade?
These questions strike at the heart of accountability within Iran’s economic system.
The allegations surrounding the “trusties” network should be independently investigated, and claims concerning individual figures must be distinguished from facts established through official records and verifiable documentation.
But even at this stage, the case raises a disturbing possibility: that Iran’s oil trade has operated through opaque networks where political connections, security affiliations, family ties, and private commercial interests intersect.
For a country whose population is struggling with inflation, currency collapse, poverty, and declining purchasing power, the alleged disappearance or non-repatriation of vast oil revenues is not an abstract financial scandal.
It is another indication of how the wealth generated by Iran’s natural resources can become concentrated within opaque networks of power—while ordinary Iranians are left to bear the economic consequences.