Treasury Department identifies cryptocurrency and money-transfer networks linked to the IRGC, sanctioned Iranian exchanges, and international drug trafficking
The US Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on eight Canadian money services businesses accused of facilitating financial transactions for Iran’s regime, sanctioned Iranian entities, and other illicit actors. The companies allegedly provided channels for transferring funds between Iran and Canada, converting Iranian rials and other currencies into digital assets, and moving money across international borders. Several were also linked to financial operations involving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and an internationally wanted drug trafficker.
The sanctions were announced on November 6, 2026, as part of Operation Economic Outcast, a US government campaign aimed at disrupting the Iranian regime’s financial networks and its use of cryptocurrency to evade international sanctions.
The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated eight businesses operating in Ontario and British Columbia: Million Exchange, Amin Exchange, NIA Nations Currency, Farah Exchange, CCC Inc, Cryptoyal, Darvish Exchange, and Top PC Technician Inc.
According to the Treasury Department, these businesses enabled sanctioned Iranian entities to move money internationally through conventional currency exchanges and digital asset transactions. Many had conducted transactions with cryptocurrency exchanges previously sanctioned by Washington or with digital asset addresses associated with the IRGC.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the United States would not allow Canada to become a safe haven for financial facilitators helping Iran’s regime and its affiliated networks circumvent sanctions. He emphasized that Washington would pursue and disrupt the regime’s financial channels wherever they operate.
Cryptocurrency Networks Linked to the IRGC
The Treasury Department identified several specific financial connections between the designated businesses and Iran’s sanctioned cryptocurrency infrastructure.
Million Exchange, operated by Ontario-based Diverse Trade Inc., advertised currency exchange services involving Iranian rials and the management of digital assets. According to OFAC, cryptocurrency addresses associated with the company transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars to addresses linked to the IRGC and other terrorism-related networks.
Amin Exchange, operating through 1380079 BC Limited and its Ontario affiliate Top PC Technician Inc, facilitated currency transfers between Iran and Canada and provided digital asset exchange services. OFAC identified hundreds of thousands of dollars in transactions between cryptocurrency addresses associated with Amin Exchange and the previously sanctioned Shelbit Exchange.
NIA Nations Currency Ltd, based in British Columbia, advertised cryptocurrency exchange services and money transfers from Iran to Canada. Its associated digital asset addresses conducted transactions with addresses linked to the IRGC and four sanctioned Iranian exchanges: Nobitex, Wallex, Ramzinex, and Bitpin.
Farah Exchange, operated by 2397639 Ontario Ltd, advertised itself as an Iranian currency exchange in Canada. Its associated digital asset address conducted hundreds of thousands of dollars in transactions with the sanctioned Shelbit and Wallex exchanges and transferred funds to addresses linked to terrorism-related activities.
OFAC also designated CCC Inc and B Galaxy Inc, which operate from the same Ontario location and provide currency and digital asset exchange services. An address associated with CCC Inc received hundreds of thousands of dollars in digital assets from addresses linked to terrorism-related activities. B Galaxy operates under the name Cryptoyal and advertised the exchange of unlimited amounts of digital assets for Iranian currencies.
The eighth company, Darvish Exchange, advertised Bitcoin-to-Iranian-rial exchange services. Its associated digital asset addresses conducted transactions with four sanctioned Iranian exchanges: Nobitex, Wallex, Aban Tether Exchange, and Shelbit.
Connections to International Drug Trafficking
The Treasury announcement also exposed links between several of the designated businesses and Ryan Wedding, a former Olympic snowboarder sanctioned by OFAC for international drug trafficking.
According to the US Treasury, Wedding used money exchange businesses in the Vancouver and Toronto areas to launder billions of dollars in drug proceeds. The operation involved couriers transporting bulk cash to exchange businesses, which converted the money into digital assets and transferred it abroad.
Several of the newly sanctioned companies had facilitated transactions for Wedding before his apprehension in January 2026. Million Exchange and Amin Exchange were specifically identified as having processed drug-related proceeds through cash-to-cryptocurrency transactions.
The coordinated action involved the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Canada’s Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC), and the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
Washington Expands Pressure on Iran’s Financial Networks
The November 6 designations build on earlier measures targeting Iran’s cryptocurrency infrastructure. On June 2, 2026, OFAC sanctioned Nobitex, Wallex, Bitpin, and Ramzinex. On August 7, it designated Aban Tether Exchange and Shelbit, identifying the latter as a channel through which millions of dollars had been moved on behalf of the IRGC.
Operation Economic Outcast, launched in August 2026, seeks to sever the financial lifelines sustaining Iran’s regime and the IRGC, particularly through the exploitation of digital assets to bypass international restrictions.
By extending sanctions beyond Iranian companies to foreign intermediaries facilitating their transactions, Washington is targeting the international infrastructure that allows the regime to access financial services despite sanctions.
The latest action underscores the growing scrutiny of cryptocurrency exchanges and money-transfer businesses operating outside Iran but connected to the regime’s financial networks. It also demonstrates that the enforcement effort is increasingly focused on the foreign companies and intermediaries that help keep these channels operational.