Despite limited oil waivers under the new agreement, the Iranian regime still faces a vast network of international sanctions that cannot be dismantled overnight.
The announcement of a new memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States has sparked intense debate among observers and political activists. Critics of the agreement argue that Tehran will emerge as the primary beneficiary, gaining access to financial resources and sanctions relief that could strengthen the regime.
A closer examination of the existing sanctions framework, however, suggests a more complicated reality.
While the agreement reportedly includes waivers allowing limited oil exports previously restricted by sanctions, the vast majority of the international sanctions architecture imposed on the regime remains intact. The regime continues to face extensive restrictions imposed by the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and other governments over its nuclear activities, human rights record, ballistic missile program, and support for regional proxy groups.
As a result, even if negotiations progress and portions of the agreement are implemented, Tehran is unlikely to gain rapid or unrestricted access to the tens of billions of dollars it has sought for years.
A Sanctions System Built Over Decades
The sanctions imposed on Iran are not the result of a single dispute or a single government decision. They have accumulated over decades through multiple legal mechanisms and international agreements.
Some sanctions were imposed because of Iran’s nuclear activities. Others stem from human rights violations, support for armed groups throughout the region, missile development programs, and the activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Because these restrictions were established under different legal authorities and by different governments and institutions, they cannot simply disappear through a single political agreement.
UN Sanctions Have Returned
The Iranian regime has long faced sanctions linked to its nuclear program and violations of obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Between 2006 and 2010, the UN Security Council adopted multiple resolutions restricting Iran’s access to military equipment, nuclear-related technologies, and international financial resources. These resolutions also imposed limitations on activities connected to nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
Although many of these restrictions were suspended following the 2015 nuclear agreement, the collapse of that arrangement and the subsequent activation of the “snapback” mechanism resulted in the return of UN sanctions.
These restrictions continue to affect Iran’s international standing and create significant barriers for foreign companies considering engagement with the country.
US Sanctions Are Far More Complex
The most significant obstacle facing the regime remains the extensive network of American sanctions.
Unlike executive orders that can be modified by a president, many sanctions on Iran are embedded in legislation passed by Congress. These measures were adopted over decades and target a wide range of activities, institutions, and individuals.
The IRGC, which plays a dominant role in both Iran’s political system and economy, remains designated by Washington as a terrorist organization. This designation alone creates major complications for any broad economic opening because the Guard Corps and its affiliated entities maintain influence across large sectors of the Iranian economy.
Many sanctions also target specific banks, companies, government organizations, shipping networks, and individuals. Even if certain restrictions are eased, removing thousands of sanctions designations would require a lengthy legal and political process.
This means that the agreement does not automatically restore Iran’s access to international finance, investment, or banking networks.
European Restrictions Also Remain
The European Union maintains its own sanctions regime against Tehran.
Over the years, the EU has imposed restrictions on Iranian oil exports, financial services, banking transactions, technology transfers, and sectors linked to the regime’s missile and drone programs.
Although some measures were eased following the 2015 nuclear agreement, many have since been restored or replaced with new sanctions.
European sanctions related to human rights abuses, military activities, and regional security concerns remain in force. Additional measures have also been introduced in response to recent developments involving Iran’s actions in the region.
Consequently, even if some commercial opportunities emerge under the new understanding, the regime will continue to face substantial barriers in its dealings with Europe.
Frozen Assets Are Not Readily Available
One of the most persistent misconceptions surrounding the agreement is the belief that Tehran will immediately gain access to all of its frozen assets abroad.
In reality, Iranian funds held in foreign banks remain subject to complex legal, banking, and sanctions restrictions.
Billions of dollars in Iranian revenues accumulated from oil and gas exports remain frozen or heavily restricted in countries such as South Korea, China, Japan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Accessing these funds would require separate arrangements, regulatory approvals, and in many cases additional sanctions relief measures that have not yet been granted.
As a result, the existence of frozen assets does not necessarily translate into immediate liquidity for the regime.
Political Relief Does Not Equal Economic Recovery
The memorandum may reduce tensions and create opportunities for further negotiations. It may also allow limited increases in oil sales and provide the regime with some breathing space.
However, the broader sanctions structure that has constrained Iran’s economy for years remains largely unchanged.
The Iranian regime continues to confront restrictions on banking, investment, technology transfers, shipping, insurance, and access to global financial markets. Many of these restrictions are tied not only to the nuclear issue but also to human rights abuses, terrorism-related designations, and the activities of the IRGC.
For that reason, claims that the agreement instantly delivers vast financial resources to Tehran overlook the legal and practical realities of the sanctions system.
The more accurate conclusion is that while the agreement may offer the regime limited economic relief and an opportunity to pursue further negotiations, the overwhelming structure of international sanctions remains in place. Any substantial financial gains would depend on future negotiations, additional legal changes, and verifiable shifts in the regime’s conduct—developments that are far from guaranteed.
