After Iran’s revolution in 1979, he was one of the members of the “Mansurin” one of the seven groups which constituted the so-called “Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Organization” in 1980.
This organization was founded by the regime’s founder Khomeini to confront the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK/PMOI) led by Masoud Rajavi, the group which is now the main opposition confronting the regime in Iran.
While founding this group, Nejat said: “The groups which constituted the Mojahedin organization shared two subjects with each other. The first is that they all accept the leadership of Khomeini and the second is that they are all against the MEK.”
He added: “If the opinion of the Supreme Leader is not applied in the activities of the organization, then where is the difference between us and the MEK, who wrote books like Economics in simple language or cognition?”
After the revolution in the early days while the regime started to suppress the Kurdish people at the western borders of Iran, supporting the then-commander of the IRGC in Kermanshah Mohamad Boroujerdi, Nejat went to Iranian Kurdistan and cooperated actively is the suppression of the Kurdish people, and he was one the founders of the “Muslim Kurdish Peshmerga Organization.”
In 1981, he became officially one of the members of the IRGC. He cooperated with Mohsen Rezai in the intelligence sections of the IRGC and was responsible for the security of the Khatam-al Anbiya Headquarters, the most important base of the regime which led the war against Iraq, until the end of the war.
Then he passed the steps of progression, thanks to his crimes and suppressions against the Iranian people and its opposition, and he served the regime as one of the most trusted lieutenants of the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Hossein Nejat’s previous positions, before being appointed as the successor to the Sarallah base in the new round, include:
- Deputy Defense Minister for parliamentary affairs from 1989 to 1990
- IRGC Inspection Officer
- Deputy of Plan and Program of IRGC
- Deputy Coordinator of the Joint Staff of the IRGC
- Deputy of the Joint Staff of the IRGC
- Commander of Sarallah Base from 1997 to 2000
- Commander of the IRGC force for the protection of the supreme leader from 2000 to 2010 (a force responsible for protecting Khamenei)
- Political and Social Deputy of the Secretariat of the Supreme National Security Council from 2010 to 2013
- Deputy Minister of Culture and Social Affairs of Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC from 2014 to 2016
- Deputy Chief of the IRGC Intelligence Organization from 2016 to 2019
- Deputy Minister of Culture and Social Affairs of Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC
On 21 June 2020, Hossein Nejat was appointed as the deputy of Sarallah Camp in Tehran by Mohammad Salami, the commander of the IRGC, for the second time, after Mohammad Ismail Kowsari.
According to state media: “Hussein Salami, as the main commander of the Sarallah base, is the commander-in-chief of the IRGC too, and due to his duties as commander of the IRGC and his many activities, he usually does not have the opportunity to command the Sarallah base directly, thus in practice, he delegates his command to his successor at this base.”
Sarallah Camp is one of the IRGC’s security bases in Tehran, whose job is to manage Tehran’s security and other cities in Tehran province. It is a government base and is the main security unit within the IRGC.
In the event of a crisis, the Sarallah base, at the discretion of the Supreme National Security Council of the regime, is responsible for establishing security in the capital Tehran. The Ministry of Intelligence, the police, and all government ministries are under its operational control in times of crisis.
Nejat had previously overseen the IRGC’s Sarallah base during the attack on the dormitory of the University of Tehran in 1999, and in 2009 was the internal security secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
At the time, Saeed Mortazavi, the then “prosecutor” of Tehran, claimed to have a document showing that the detainees of the 2009 protests had been transferred to the Kahrizak hangars in July 2009 on the direct order of Hossein Nejat.
From July 2009, the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal, located at 15 Khordad Street and its interrogation rooms witnessed the presence of the interrogation teams of the Sarallah Sepah base, while the summoning, filing, and arrest of protesters were organized in maximum coordination between the Sarallah camp, the police, the Basij and the Ministry of Intelligence.
In October 2009, Esmail Kosari in an interview with the Etemad daily confessed clearly that the procedure of Interrogation and confession from the arrested people of the 2009 protests, was a program run by the Sarallah base and said:
“In the incidents that took place after June 12th, the Ministry of Intelligence and the NAJA first took action, but after the scope of the riots and clashes expanded, the Sarallah the base took action at the discretion of the Supreme National Security Council.”
Nejat has also previously been the cultural deputy and successor to the IRGC’s intelligence service, the founder of the Siraj Cyberspace Organization, and its provincial units, to suppress cyberspace activists.
Many political prisoners currently being held in the regime’s prisons have been arrested by the IRGC’s intelligence service, whose deputy was Nejat. The plaintiff of many of these prisoners mentioned in their case was the Sarallah base.
The IRGC’s intelligence service, which was under the control of Hossein Nejat, was responsible for many cases of human rights violations against hundreds of journalists, political and civil rights activists, religious minorities, and many other cyberspace activists.
He early said about one of his activities: “About the arresting of Jason Rezaian (now one of the regime’s apologists) and the related operation, this act was done by the IRGC’s intelligence and through it, we were able to release part of the assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
It seems that his appointment as the successor of the Sarallah base is not without reason. The protests of 2017 and 2019 and the current social situation show that in the upcoming months the possibility of new protests is very high.