As Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, takes office, he has declared the 20-year vision document as one of the major economic goals and guiding principles of his government. This claim has been met with widespread criticism, as the document is set to expire in just one year. How can a nearly obsolete plan serve as the foundation for economic progress and growth?
Mohammadreza Aref, Pezeshkian’s first deputy, acknowledged this criticism but argued that the government cannot move forward until the goals outlined in this document have been achieved. However, even among regime officials and experts, there is serious doubt that four years will be sufficient to reach the declared objectives, given the performance of governing institutions over the past nineteen years. From its inception, the document faced objections due to its ambitious and unrealistic outlook.
The 20-year vision document, initiated in 2004, was designed to chart Iran’s development trajectory across various sectors, including cultural, scientific, economic, political, and social domains. Compiled by the regime’s Expediency Discernment Council at the suggestion of its assembly, the document’s implementation was structured around four 5-year development programs, with 2025 marking its conclusion.
The project was originally conceived by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who secured the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to formulate a comprehensive strategic plan. Khamenei viewed this as the country’s “strategic missing link,” intended to address inconsistencies between governing institutions in achieving the regime’s macro goals. Although the document didn’t come to fruition during Rafsanjani’s presidency, its implementation began during Mohammad Khatami’s first term.
From the outset, the document faced two fundamental challenges. First, it suffered from excessive optimism and unrealistic goal-setting. Second, it adhered to regime standards and values that often contradicted 21st-century human values. The document ignored popular forms of governance in favor of the supreme leader’s authority, promoting a static and directive approach rather than an interactive and collaborative one between society and the regime.
Moreover, the cultural values outlined in the document were inconsistent with the views of the majority of Iranian society. Politically, it advocated for the continuation of authoritarianism and a closed ideological approach under the guise of “religious democracy.” This concept, which incorporates religious values into governance, applies to countries where religion significantly influences laws and regulations.
The document’s opening definition of Iran’s target society is particularly revealing:
“Iran is a developed country with the first economic, scientific, and technological position in the region, with an Islamic and revolutionary identity, an inspiration in the Islamic world, and engaged in constructive interaction in international relations.”
This vision, however, conflicts with another stated goal of “solidarity between the people and the government,” highlighting the regime’s lack of intention to address the country’s growing social and political crises.
The document further emphasizes Iran’s role in the Islamic world, stating: “Inspiring, active, and effective in the Islamic world by strengthening the model of Islamic religious people, developing an efficient, moral society, and intellectual and social dynamism that impacts Islamic and regional integration based on the thoughts and teachings of Imam Khomeini.”
This definition clearly demonstrates an ideological view that rejects cultural and political pluralism. The overall policies in cultural, scientific, and technological affairs reveal a ruling system resistant to revision, emphasizing religious knowledge, the perpetuation of Khomeini’s thoughts, and the strengthening of national identity based on Islam and the Islamic revolution.
In terms of social, political, defense, and security goals, the document advocates for strengthening national identity among youth according to Islamic revolution ideals and emphasizes the role of people’s forces in maintaining security and defending the country. These objectives have manifested in controversial policies such as guidance patrols, the use of violence, and the imposition of compulsory hijab.
The foreign policy section contains conflicting objectives that have contributed to escalating tensions and sanctions. While calling for constructive relations with non-belligerent countries, it also advocates for dealing with “extravagance and interventionist actions” in foreign relations, freeing the region from foreign military presence, and supporting “oppressed and vulnerable nations.”
Interestingly, these clauses contradict other stated goals, such as leveraging political relations to attract foreign investment and advanced technology, expanding bilateral and international cooperation, and avoiding tension in relations with other countries.
While many of the economic goals outlined in the document are positive in theory, they have proven to be rhetorical and overly ambitious, lacking concrete plans and roadmaps for implementation. Subsequent development plans based on this vision document have suffered from the same chronic and fundamental defects.
As the document approaches its final year, it’s clear that most of its goals have not been achieved, except in defense and military affairs. Contrary to the vision’s main objective, Iran’s regional standing in terms of economy, development, and global position has significantly deteriorated compared to 2013.
The targeted average annual economic growth of eight percent has not been realized; instead, Iran has experienced an almost zero percent growth rate over the past decade. Unemployment rates, while showing some improvement, have largely failed to meet the document’s ambitious targets. Even official statistics, often viewed with skepticism, indicate that unemployment trends have been inconsistent and largely above pre-vision document levels.
Iran’s position in economic growth and anti-corruption efforts has regressed. The country’s rank in the Corruption Perception Index has plummeted from 87 in the first year of the vision document to 149 among 180 countries in recent years. Inflation has been a persistent challenge, averaging 25% over the past nineteen years and fluctuating between 9% and nearly 47%.
During the implementation of the vision document, political and social divisions have deepened. Iran has faced heavy Western sanctions and become increasingly dependent on Eastern countries in its foreign policy. At one point, Iran was even placed under Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter as a threat to international peace and stability.
Foreign investment, a key component of the vision, has failed to materialize as planned. While official figures claim an increase from $4.2 billion in 2004 to $5.5 billion in 2023, these numbers are questioned by many. Even if accepted, they fall far short of the estimated $80 billion per year required to achieve the document’s targeted 8% annual economic growth.
The country’s development infrastructure has suffered severe erosion and depreciation after an initial period of growth. Poverty, corruption, and resource exploitation have increased dramatically, while channels for political participation have narrowed. Strategic corruption now forms the main basis of governance.
In light of these realities, references to the vision document lack credibility and reflect a detachment from actual conditions. Achieving the document’s goals is both impossible and counterproductive due to its internal contradictions, disregard for the political, cultural, and social demands of the majority, and the overambitious nature of its defined objectives.
Without fundamental changes to the current political situation, realizing the goals of the twenty-year vision document remains a distant dream. President Pezeshkian’s reliance on this outdated and flawed document suggests a misunderstanding of the deep-rooted issues facing Iran and the need for comprehensive reforms beyond the scope of the existing framework.
