An article in the Wall Street Journal quotes former nonproliferation advisor Robert Einhorn as saying that such an extension might be politically risky for the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a way that it would not be for the United States. That is, Iran will suffer the continuation of US-led sanctions and restrictions if a deal is not reached, whereas the US faces no real consequences other than a lack of access to Iranian import/export markets. Einhorn also casts doubt on the public statements coming from both sides, which claim that they are entirely focused on meeting the deadline and have not considered the terms of an extension.
In an interview at Roll Call, Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, comments on the moves that Iran is likely to make in the event of an extension. Perhaps taking note of recent comments to this effect by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, Dubowitz says that Iran may be particularly focused on the duration of any agreement that is reached. He believes that the Islamic Republic is focused on convincing the West to eventually treat it as “a normalized nuclear power.” But he goes on to say, “I don’t think Iran’s nuclear program under this regime should ever be normalized. All of these strictures and constraints should remain in place for forever, until this regime is no longer this regime.”
Perhaps recognizing the benefits of its charm offensive and the pragmatic approach to foreign policy that has defined the Rouhani presidency, Iran may be relinquishing one of its notoriously combative points of contention with the West. According to some reports, including one in Bloomberg, the regime is considering Rouhani’s current Chief of Staff Mohammad Nahavandian as a new pick for ambassador to the UN. He would replace Hamid Aboutalebi, whom the US denied a visa because of his involvement in the 1979 Iran hostage crisis. Iran has refused to name an alternate choice, even signaling willingness to sue Washington over the matter. To date, that remains their position. Despite the rumors, regime officials deny that Nahavandian is being considered for the post.
Meanwhile, closer to home Iran is continuing in its quest to secure partnerships from regional players, including other oil-exporting countries. In recent weeks and months, Iran has apparently signed or at least unilaterally announced deals giving it control over aspects of exploration, drilling, or refinement of oil from other countries in the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, the Islamic Republic is using its active role in regional conflicts to create leverage within countries that fear either Sunni militants or Shiite militias.