Full transparency needed in any nuclear deal with Iran

A report by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) unveiled last week shows that the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has declared international monitoring of its military sites to be a red line not to be crossed.

The report documents how for the past two years in negotiations with the world powers the regime each time called for “trust building” instead of “transparency”. There has been a deliberate effort on the part of Tehran to marginalize the issue of “transparency” regarding the possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear program.

Earlier this week a senior US official involved in the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with the Iranian regime suggested that the US administration might be willing to relax its demand for complete unrestricted access at all Iranian sites.

As Rep. Ed Royce, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on Sunday told Fox News, “Without verification, without the ability to have international inspectors go onto those military sites and be able to get the questions answered, without the ability to talk to those Iranian scientists, this deal wouldn’t be worth the paper it is written on “.

Such a concession to the mullahs would only embolden the regime and limit the international community’s influence to stop the mullahs from pursuing the military aspects of their nuclear work. In reality the world community has no grounds to trust anything the Iranian regime says.

Let’s briefly look at the background. Exactly how many of the known Iranian nuclear sites were announced from the outset by the regime? Not a single one.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran was the first group to reveal to the world the regime’s nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak in 2002, but since then, the NCRI has exposed dozens of other Iranian nuclear sites and information about the structure and activities of the regime to build a nuclear weapon. Tehran has only acknowledged the existence of each of its nuclear centers after they were irrefutably exposed by the NCRI.

Chronological list of some of the most significant revelations by the NCRI of various secret sites and aspects of the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons program (partial list):

1. August 2002: NCRI disclosed two secret sites of the regime in Natanz (uranium enrichment) and Arak (heavy water plutonium reactor). Details of the Natanz site including two 25000 square meter salons under the ground were exposed. Exact location of Arak’s site and its secretive nature was explained. After proving the NCRI information was correct with satellite imagery, the IAEA visited Natanz and Arak.

2. February 2003: NCRI exposed that the Iranian regime was testing centrifuges in Abe-Ali site, under the guise of a watch factory named Kalaye Electric Company. Iranian regime changed the building’s entire appearance to hide its true nature. After months of insistence by the IAEA to gain access, when finally the international inspectors managed to visit the site, environmental samples tested by the IAEA later confirmed it to have been a secret nuclear site.

3. May 2003: NCRI disclosed the Shian- Lavizan site and the research conducted there. The map and location of the site were defined. This location was the center of nuclear and biological activities. When the IAEA visited Shian in June 2004, the Iranian regime tried to disguise its purpose, but radioactivity was still found there. The NCRI’s information was proven correct but the regime had given the place a huge face lift.

4. May 2003: Disclosure of the Lashgar Abad site in Karaj and the Nurafza Gostar company. Iranian regime first showed another site to the IAEA visitors in an attempt to show that the NCRI’s claims were not correct, but after two months they were forced to show the true location. Experimenting enrichment using laser was discovered by IAEA visitors in 2004.

5. November 2004: The new technology center (Mojdeh site) and the names of their experts were revealed in an NCRI press conference in Paris. In the conference, the Iranian Resistance revealed the identity of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the point man of the regime’s clandestine nuclear program who had been kept secret until then. The IAEA has been insisting to interview Fakhrizadeh for the past few years, but the Iranian regime has not provided access.

6. December 2005: In a press conference in Paris, the NCRI revealed the construction of a series of secret new sites, including one in Qom. Four years later it was established that that site was the clandestine Fordow site, used for enriching uranium.

7. April 2011: The NCRI revealed that a secret site called Taba factory was used for production of centrifuges. The clerical regime initially denied and later confirmed the report.

8. July 2011: The NCRI revealed that the structure of the organization in charge of pursuing the nuclear weapons under the supervision of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh had changed and the new operation was called Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND). The IAEA confirmed this in its November 2011 report.