Terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, regularly launch rocket attacks on Israel, but because they are not “recognized state actors” launching rocket attacks on another sovereign state, we do not put the min the same category. All terrorist groups attacking a state therefore get a free pass.
A nuclear device in the hands of such terrorist groups — chosen precisely because they cannot be readily identified as working for, or connected to, a state — can therefore be used in an attack with impunity, totally undermining the assumption that such weapons in the hands of Iran are “only for deterrence.”
Unless we end the Iranian nuclear weapons program now, we will probably only know if a threat is “real” after it is too late.
The Iranian Supreme Leader announced last week that further negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program are ended, asserting that “jihad” will continue until America is destroyed.
Whatever the future of a nuclear “deal” with Iran, still missing are both an analysis of what specific deal is technically required to end the Iranian nuclear weapons program compared to what is now on the table, and whether the assumptions many in the West bring for an agreement to succeed hold up under scrutiny.
To answer the first problem, an analysis by Gregory Jones of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) explores the faults with the current proposals.
First, according to Jones, Iran can still quickly produce Highly Enriched Uranium [HEU], the stuff from which nuclear weapons are built. As Jones emphasizes, “this means Iran is already a de facto nuclear weapon state.” Any agreements, therefore, must “deny Iran access to HEU either in the short or long term,” as well as prevent Iran’s Arak nuclear reactor from being “reconverted to be able to produce” plutonium from which nuclear bomb fuel can be made.
